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PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW CLAIMS
AFTER LINGLE v. NORGE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution' implicitly
grants Congress the power to enact legislation which preempts state
law.2 Congress exercised this power in passing the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 3 and the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). 4
1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause reads:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be

made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby;
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.

Id.
2. The supremacy clause, coupled with a congressional act within its delegated power, has the effect of preempting state law when the state law conflicts
with federal law, or when the federal government has intended to "occupy the
field." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-25 to -29, at 479-511 (2d
ed. 1988).
3. The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as
amended by Pub. L. No. 80-101 and Pub. L. No. 86-257 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)). The NLRA was designed to remedy disruption in
interstate commerce arising from labor disputes over representation and bargaining by granting federal protection to employees' right to organize and join
labor unions. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 21 (1976). The Act also declared certain employer activities illegal and set up an administrative agency, the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB or the Board) to monitor activities of employers and unions. Id. at
5. For a discussion of the history of the Wagner Act, see C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 3-30 (1983).
The constitutionality of the NLRA was tested in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The Court found, inter alia, that the employer
unfair labor provisions in the NLRA did not deny the employer the liberty to
contract without due process. Id. at 43-48. The Court also held that Congress'
regulation of labor relations is within its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce under article I of the United States Constitution. Id. at 29-32.
For a further discussion of theJones & Laughlin case, see R. GORMAN, Supra, at 21.
4. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley), Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61
Stat. 136, as anended bv Pub. L. No. 86-257 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-197 (1982)). The LMRA supplemented and amended the NLRA as a
response to the increase in union membership, greater use of the strike, and
criticism that the NLRB had a tendency to overregulate employers. See R.
GORMAN, supra note 3, at 5-6. In addition to providing federal coLrtjtrisdiction
over suits to enforce labor contracts and making unions suable entities, the
LMRA's provisions: (1) gave the courts of appeals greater authority to review
and set aside Board findings in unfair labor practice cases; (2) expressly limited
what constituted unfair labor practices on the part of an employer and defined
what constitutes unfair labor practices bv tnions; and (3) required tnions to file
reports on internal procedures and finances, and allowed employees to refrain

(1035)
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By regulating labor relations under these statutes, Congress sought to
5
promote industrial peace and stability through a uniform body of law.
However, Congress did not fully legislate the area of labor relations and
left unclear which areas of state law remained unpreempted. 6 Consequently, courts inherited the task of defining federal and state authority
7
in labor relations.
The United States Supreme Court has articulated three major areas
of preemption in labor law. 8 This Note will focus on the third of these
from joining unions. Id. For a discussion of the industrial unrest leading to the
enactment of the LMRA, see C. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 35-45.
5. See R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 1.
6. See Cox & Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARV. L. REV. 211,
212 (1950). The authors note: "[Piroblems of supremacy and accommodation
are essentially issues of legislative policy .... Yet it is the practice for Congress
to avoid the decision, thus leaving the problems to the Supreme Court. And the
Court, paradoxically, then draws the necessary lines by asking-in form if not in
actuality-where Congress drew them." Id. See also Gregory, The Labor Preemption Doctrine: Hamiltonian Renaissance or Last Hiuah?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507,
514-17 (1986) ("Judicial discernment of legislative intent usually is a myth
designed to camouflage judicial policymaking.").
7. See Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (state law
preempted if "it conflicts with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme,
or unless the courts discern from the totality of the circumstances that Congress
sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of the States") (citation omitted).
According to one commentator, even if "legislative intent were clear .. .
labor preemption decisions still would have to transcend mechanistic determinations. Only the Court properly can make these complex policy decisions because they are not the product of statutory construction alone; they also are the
product of overriding federalism and supremacy principles grounded in the
Constitution." Gregory, snpra note 6, at 517 (footnote omitted).
8. The first area of preemption was developed in San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In Garmion, the Supreme Court considered the extent of the jurisdiction of the NLRB over §§ 7 and 8 of the NLRA.
Section 7 of the act protects certain "concerted activities" while § 8 prohibits
"unfair" labor practices. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1982). The Court in Garmon
concluded that both state and federal courts must defer to the NLRB when the
subject matter of the claim is "arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act." Garnion, 359 U.S. at 245. The Garnion holding is known as the "primary jurisdiction
doctrine." See Smith & Kays, Preemptitg State Regnlation of Employment Relations. A
.1lodelfor Analysis, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 35, 36 (1985). This doctrine requires that
state courts not decide disputes within the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB
because conflicting adjudication by the courts and the NLRB would undermine
the uniform scheme which Congress intended when enacting the NLRA. See
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246: C. MORRIS, snpra note 3, at 788-89.
There are exceptions to the Garmon "primary jurisdiction doctrine." First,
there is no preemption when the state law only remotely affects the NLRA. Garnion, 359 U.S. at 243-44 (citing International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales,
356 U.S. 617 (1958)). There is no preemption where the state is regulating activity which is "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility." Id. at 244. For
a discussion of the Gariion doctrine and its exceptions, see Gregory, supra note 6,
at 523-50 (after Garmon, steady erosion of labor preemption occurred through
judicial exceptions); Weeks, .VI RA Preemptioni oJ State Common Law II'rongfid Dischatge Clainis: The Bhopal Brigade Goes Iloiie, 13 PEiPPERDINE L. REV. 607, 621-60
(1986).
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areas-preemption under section 301 of the LMRA.1' In section 301 of
the LMRA, Congress made collective bargaining agreements enforceable as contracts and bestowed on federal courts the jurisdiction to enforce these labor contracts on behalf of both parties to the contract."'
To this end, section 301 also allows federal courts to create a body of
federal labor law for purposes of interpreting and enforcing these labor
contracts.II Section 301 preempts any state causes of action for conThe second area of preemption analysis focuses upon whether Congress
intended the conduct involved to be unregulated and left "to be controlled by
the free play of economic forces." NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144
(1971). The Court used this analysis in Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976). In International
.Machiniststhe Supreme Court held that federal labor policy preempted the authority of a state labor relations board to regulate the use of economic weaponry
because Congress had intended that conduct not be regulated at all. The Court
found that a union's refusal to work overtime was self-help economic activity
which Congress intended to leave unregulated. Id. at 148-49.
There are exceptions to this preemption doctrine. See, e.g., Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (state statute requiring minimum mental health care benefits for employees not preempted under NLRA or
ERISA); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978) (state statute on
pension rights not preempted because of express congressional approval of
state regulation).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). Section 301 of the LMRA states in pertinent
part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce
...may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties ....
(b) Anv labor organization .... [m]ay sue or be sued as an entity and
in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the
United States.
Id.
The majority of suits brought under § 301 are actions to enforce arbitration
awards or promises to arbitrate. R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 547. The Supreme
Court has stated that the agreed-upon grievance-arbitration procedures must be
exhausted before bringing an action under § 301. See Republic Steel Corp. v.
Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). For a further discussion of Maddox and exhaustion of grievance-arbitration procedures, see itifra notes 36-42 and accompanying text. Most collective bargaining agreements have provisions concerning the
resolution of contract disputes and one of the final steps in dispute resolution is
arbitration. See 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION (1983); R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 541.
Arbitration can be conducted
before an individual or a panel and the arbitrator may be designated on an ad

hoc or permanent basis. 0.

FAIRWEATHER,

snpa, at 80-81.

10. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451-54 (1957) (section 301 was designed to promote industrial peace by conferring.jurisdiction on
federal courts to enforce labor contracts on behalf of either party); see also S.
REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947), reprinted in NATIONAL LAB. REL.
BD., I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TlE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947,
at 421 (1985) [hereinafter LEGISI.ATIVE HISTORY LMRAI (collective bargaining
contracts are to be equally binding and enforceable on both parties in order to
stabilize industrial peace). See generall Cox, Some ..Ispects of lie Labor .llanagement
Relations dcl, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 274 (1947).
I1. Li.,coln Vills, 353 U.S. at 451, 456. The Court in Lincoln Vills looked to
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tract violations between an employer and a labor organization. 1 2 Further, the only contractural obligations enforceable in courts are
violations of the grievance and arbitration procedures.' 3 Unlike other
4
bases for labor preemption, which balance state and federal interests,'
section 301 preemption requires that all "incompatible doctrines of 115
cal law must give way to principles of federal labor law."'
The legislative history of section 301 suggests: (1) that the grievance and arbitration process be exhausted before a section 301 action
may be brought; (2) that arbitration awards be given effect; and (3) that
obligations under the collective bargaining agreement be defined by
federal law.' 6 Past Supreme Court cases interpreting the preemptive
effect of section 301 have largely given effect to these policies.1 7 Howthe record of the House debate where "it became abundantly clear that the purpose of the section was to provide the necessary legal remedies." Id. at 455.
The Court concluded that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301 is
federal common law fashioned from federal labor policy. Id. at 456. See also
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY LMRA, supra note 10, at 423 (language from Senate Report contained in Lincoln Mills). For a further discussion of Lincoln Mills, see infra
notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
12. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64 (1987) ("[section] 301's preemptive force is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause
of action" within its scope) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Labors
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983)).
13. See R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 547; Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, in Proc. of the 29th Ann. Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 97, 101-02 (1976) (ideally, arbitration is based on proposition that rights of
employees and employers in employment relationship are governed by autonomous, self-contained system of private law).
14. See, e.g., Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1978) (no
preemption where Congress has impliedly or expressly left some regulation to
states with respect to issues which may be subjects of collective bargaining);
Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 25, 430 U.S.
290, 302 (1977) (no preemption under San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), where "the State has a substantial interest in regulation of the conduct at issue and the State's interest is one that does not threaten
undue interference with the federal regulatory scheme").
15. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962)
("[T]he subject matter of § 301(a) 'is peculiarly one that calls for uniform
law.' ") (quoting Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569
(1919)).
For a general discussion of preemption under the NLRA, see H. PERRIrr,
EMPLOYMENT DISMISSAL, LAW AND PRACTICE 98-104 (2d ed. 1987); Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations: 11, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1954); Cox, Labor Law
Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972); Cox, Recent Developments in
Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 277 (1980); Cox & Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARV. L. REV. 211 (1950); Gregory, supra note 6;
Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress and StateJurisdiction over Labor Relations: 11, 59
COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1959); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations: 1, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 6 (1959).
16. For a discussion of each of these § 301 principles, see infra notes 21-42
and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of past Supreme Court decisions that have given effect

to § 301 policies, see infra notes 21-42 and accompanying text.
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ever, in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef Inc., 8 the Supreme Court
held that section 301 preempts state law claims only if interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement is required when applying state
law.I' This decision represents a departure from the Court's interpretation of section 301 during the past thirty years in that: (1) the use of the
grievance and arbitration procedures is not required; (2) the arbitrator's
award is not given effect; and (3) uniform interpretation of obligations
under labor contracts is frustrated by state court interpretations of state
law claims which affect the employment relationship. 2 ° Part II of this
Note reviews the history of section 301 preemption. Part III examines
the split among the circuits before Lingle on the issue of whether section
301 preempts state law claims and discusses the Lingle decision, which
purports to resolve this split of authority. Part IV then analyzes the Lingle decision and concludes that Lingle frustrates the policies underlying
section 301 and does not relieve the tension between state law claims
and section 301 preemption. Part V illustrates this continued tension by
discussing decisions since Lingle.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Congressional Intent and the Principles Underlying Section 301 Preemption

The Supreme Court generally begins preemption analysis by examining congressional intent concerning the preemptive effect of a federal
statute.2 1 However, Congress did not explicitly state whether, and to
what extent, section 301 preempted state law. 22 Consequently, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the preemptive effect of section 301 by
23
identifying and giving effect to the policies behind the section.
18. 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988).
19. Id. at 1885. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Lingle, see infra
notes 121-54 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the effect of Lingle, see infra notes 155-80 and accompanying text.
21. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985) ("The purpose
of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.") (quoting Malone v. White Motor
Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)). But see C. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 783-84
(Supreme Court bases preemption decisions on national labor policy choices);
Smith & Kays, supra note 8, at 35 (given lack of statutory guidance, labor preemption cases reflect adjudication of Court's own balancing of diverse policy
considerations in context of particular facts).
22. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 208; see also Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955) (Congress did not exhaust full sweep of legislative
power over industrial relations-obvious conflict, actual or potential, with federal authority, results in easy exclusion of state action); Garner v. Teamsters
Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953) (LMRA "leaves much to the states, though
Congress has refrained from telling us how much").
23. See Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 209-13. Cf. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 240 (1959) ("[T]he task ... was ... cast upon this
Court in carrying out with fidelity the purposes of Congress, but doing so by
giving application to congressional incompletion."). The issue of lack of con-
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The Supreme Court has articulated several policies underlying the
application of section 301 to labor contract actions. The first of these
policies is that labor contracts need uniform interpretation to ensure
smooth negotiation and administration of collective bargaining agreements.2 4 The Supreme Court advanced this policy in Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills. 2 5 In Lincoln Mills, the Court looked to the text of section

301 and its legislative history to determine whether federal courts had
2 6
authority to enforce provisions in a collective bargaining agreement..
The Court found that one of the purposes of section 301 was the enforcement by either party of collective bargaining agreements as contracts in federal courts. 2 7 Through enforcement of collective bargaining

gressional direction in this area has been discussed by commentators. See, e.g.,
Gregory, supra note 6, at 516-17; Smith & Kays, supra note 8, at 35-36.

24. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). In
Lucas Flour, the Court stated:
The possibility that individual contract terms might have different
meanings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements. Because neither party could be certain of the rights
which it had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating an agreement would be made measurably more difficult by the necessity of trying to formulate contract provisions in such a way as to contain the
same meaning under two or more systems of law which might someday
be invoked in enforcing the contract.
Id. at 103.
25. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). In Lincoln Mills, a union and an employer had
entered into a collective bargaining agreement which provided that grievances
would be handled pursuant to a specified procedure. Id. at 449. The issue in
the case concerned several grievances filed and processed through the specified
grievance procedure to the final step of arbitration. Id. The employer refused
to arbitrate and the union brought suit to compel arbitration. Id. The district
court ordered the employer to comply with the grievance arbitration procedures
and the court of appeals reversed holding that the district court had no authority
to grant relief. Id.
26. Id. at 451-52. The Court looked to subsections of § 301 and concluded
that subsection (a) supplied the basis for jurisdiction over labor contracts in the
federal courts. Id. The Court also concluded that subsection (a) allowed specific
enforcement of the contracts. Id. Subsection (b) made it possible for a labor
organization to sue or be sued. Id. For the full text of § 301, see supra note 9.
The Court also looked to and cited extensively from Senate, House and
Conference reports which accompanied passage of the LMRA. Lincoln Mills, 353

U.S. at 452-56. The Conference Report stated: "Once parties have made a collective bargaining contract the enforcement of that contract should be left to the
usual processes of the law and not to the National Labor Relations Board." Id.
at 452 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., at 42 (1947)).

The Court pointed out that both the Senate and the House provided for the
"usual processes of the law" by provisions substantially equivalent to § 301 (a) in
its present form. Id. at 453.
27. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 454. The Court stated:
[T]o encourage the making of agreements and to promote industrial
peace through faithful performance by the parties, collective agreements affecting interstate commerce should be enforceable in the Federal courts. Our amendment would provide for suits by unions as legal
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agreements as contracts, parties would be held to a higher degree of
responsibility and, thus, further the congressional intent of promoting
industrial peace.2 8 The Court stated that the "agreement to arbitrate
grievance disputes is the quidpro quo for an agreement not to strike" and
thus section 301 does more than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts
over labor organizations.2 " The Court stated that section 301 not only
confers jurisdiction in federal courts over both parties to an agreement,
but also allows federal courts to provide the necessary legal remedies. t o
Therefore, the Court held that section 301 authorizes federal courts to
fashion a body of federal common law for the enforcement and interpre3
tation of collective bargaining agreements. '
In Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 3 2 the Court stressed that the
purpose of uniform interpretation is to protect the keystone of the federal scheme-the ordering and adjusting of competing interests through
collective bargaining. 33 The Court stated that state law which frustrates
the smooth functioning of that process would strike at the very core of
federal labor policy. 34 To further this policy of uniform interpretation,

the Supreme Court has stated that this federal common law applies to all
35
section 301 actions, whether brought in state or federal court.
Another major policy underlying section 301 is the promotion and
protection of collectively-bargained grievance-arbitration procedures in
order to maintain peaceful labor relations.3 " The Supreme Court, in
entities and against unions as legal entities in the Federal courts in disputes affecting commerce.
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong. 1st Sess., at 16 (1947)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 455.
30. Id. "[Slection 302 [substantial equivalent of § 301], the section dealing
with equal responsibility under collective bargaining contracts in strike actions

and proceedings in district courts contemplates not only the ordinary lawsuits
for damages but also such other remedial proceedings, both legal and equitable,
Id. at 455-56 (quoting 93
as might be appropriate in the circumstances ......
CONG. REc. 3656-57 (1947)) (statement of Rep. Barden during debate on floor
of House of Representatives).
Professor Gorman agrees with this reasoning. He states that if both sides to
a collective bargaining agreement know they will be held to their promises to
resolve conflict through arbitration, use of economic weaponry-the strike-becomes a secondary remedy. R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 545.
31. Lincoln .M1ills, 353 U.S. at 451, 456.
32. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
33. Id. at 104.
34. Id.
35. See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968);
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962) (state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 301 claims).
36. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965). The
Maddox Court stated, "Congress has expressly approved contract grievance procedures as a preferred method for settling disputes .... " Id. Section 203(d) of
the LMRA states: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising
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Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,3 7 furthered this policy by holding that parties to a collective bargaining agreement must exhaust the grievancearbitration procedures under the agreement before bringing a section
301 action in federal court.3 81 In a series of cases known as the Steelworkers' Trilogy, the Supreme Court articulated the preference for arbitration
as the method for final dispute resolution."' ) In United Steelworkers v. Enover the application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement." 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
37. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
38. Id. at 652. The Maddox Court, in establishing this exhaustion requirement, stated:
A contrary rule which would permit an individual employee to
completely sidestep available grievance procedures in favor of a lawsuit
has little to commend it. .

.

. [Ilit would deprive [the] employer and

[the] union of the ability to establish a uniform and exclusive method
for orderly settlement of employee grievances. If a grievance procedure cannot be made exclusive, it loses much of its desirability as a
method of settlement. A rule creating such a situation "would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements."
Id. at 653 (quoting Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103
(1962)).
39. The three cases constituting the trilogy are: United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.'564 (1960). In these cases, the Court discussed the
role of courts and the relationship of the judiciary to arbitration proceedings.
The Court emphasized the lack of institutional competence of courts in contrast
to that of arbitrators, the centrality of arbitration to collective bargaining and the
vital role arbitration plays in industrial peace and stability. Herman, l'rongful
Discharge Actions After Lueck and Metropolitan Life Insurance: The Erosion of Individual Rights and Collective Strength?, 9 INDUS. REL. L.J. 596, 606-07 (1987); see also
Coleman, .Mluddy ll'aters: Allis-Chalmers and the Federal Polic'y Favoring Labor Arbitration, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 345, 355-64 (1987); Heinsz,]Judicial Review of
Labor Arbit ration -lwards: The Enterprise Wheel Goes Around and Around, 52 Mo. L.
REV. 243 (1987).
In the first case in the trilogy, American 11anifactnring, the Court compelled
arbitration in a suit by a union involving a dispute over a specific contract provision. American lIfg., 363 U.S. 564. The collective bargaining agreement between the union and the employer contained a provision providing that all
disputes over contract terms must go to arbitration. Id. at 565. The Court
stated that, in this situation, its involvement was limited by the established policy
favoring private resolution of employment disputes. Id. at 567-68. Therefore,
the Court could only determine "whether the party seeking arbitration is making
a claim which on its face is governed by the contract." Id. at 568.
In the second case in the trilogy, Gulf Navigation, the Court compelled arbitration even where Warrior & Gulf had inserted language in the agreement stating that "matters which are strictly a function of management shall not be
subject to arbitration." Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 576. The Court reasoned
that the language in the agreement did not overcome the policy favoring arbitration; that arbitration was a substitute for industrial strife and not just a substitute
for litigation; and that disputes should be resolved through arbitration "unless it
may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible
of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute." Id. at 578-83. See also
Coleman, supra, at 356-59 (discussing federal labor policy favoring arbitration).
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terprise Wheel & Car Corp.,4 0 the third case in the Trilogy, the Court ad-

dressed the issue of when a court should review an arbitrator's award.
The Court stated that the federal policy favoring labor dispute resolution through grievance-arbitration procedures required courts to review
the merits of an arbitration award only if it exceeded the arbitrator's
scope of authority to interpret and apply the collective bargaining agreement. 4 1 The Court asserted that plenary review by courts on the merits
of arbitration awards would undercut the finality of arbitration award
provisions relied on by both parties to collective bargaining
agreements .42
B.

Exceptions to Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration

There are three situations in which the Supreme Court has held that
an individual's right of action derived from an employment relationship
overrides the federal labor policy of favoring grievance-arbitration procedures contained in the collective bargaining agreement. In these instances, the individual employee is not required to exhaust the
grievance-arbitration proceduies. The first is where an employer by its
actions has repudiated the grievance-arbitration procedure. 4 " The second is where an employee brings suit against the union for a breach of
40. 363 U.S. 593 (1960). In Enterprise WT'heel, the union and the employer
had entered into a collective bargaining agreement containing provisions covering suspension and discharge of employees and outlining the grievance arbitration process. Id. at 594-95. The union brought an action in federal district court
after the employer refused to arbitrate a dispute over discharged employees. Id.
at 595. The district court ordered arbitration, and the arbitrator subsequently
found for the employees and awarded reinstatement with back pay, minus pay
for a suspension period and income from other employment. Id. The district
court subsequently ordered the employer to comply with the arbitrator's award.
Id.
The court of appeals agreed that the district court had jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration award under a collective bargaining agreement. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Co. v. United Steelworkers, 269 F.2d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1959), rev'd
on other grounds, 363 U.S. 593 (1960). However, the court of appeals found the
arbitrator's award to be unenforceable because it did not specify the amounts to
be deducted from the back pay, and it awarded back pay subsequent to the date
.of termination of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. The court of appeals
thus remanded the case to complete the arbitration on the questions of the
amount due to the grievant for loss of time. Id.
41. Enterprise WI'heel, 363 U.S. at 597-98. The Court stated:
[Ain arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand
of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many
sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words
manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to
refuse enforcement of the award.
Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 598-99.
43. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967).
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its duty of fair representation. 44 The third is where an individual has
asserted a substantive right derived from a federal statute. 45, An example of the final exception is demonstrated in Alexander v. Gardner-Denve,
44. See id. at 185-90. In I'aca, the Court noted that an employee would be
excepted from the Aaddox exhaustion requirement where the union has sole responsibility for arbitration and acts in an arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith
manner in refusing to process the employee's grievance. Id. at 185, 190. For a
discussion of Aladdox, see supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1976), the Court held that
"enforcement of the finality provision where the arbitrator has erred is conditioned upon the union's having satisfied its statutory duty fairly to represent the
employee in connections with the arbitration proceedings." Id. at 571. In his
dissent, Justice (currently Chief Justice) Rehnquist asserted that "the Court has
cast aside the finality of arbitration decisions and established a new policy of
encouraging challenges to arbitration decrees by the losing party on the ground
that he was not properly represented." Id. at 574 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). See
generally J. MCKELVEY, THE DUTY

OF FAIR REPRESENTATION

(1977); Coleman,

supra note 39, at 365 (in order to advance peaceful resolution of industrial strife,
courts must recognize exception to federal labor policy favoring arbitration
when employee proves breach of duty of fair representation).
Relatively few allegations of unfair representation involve the union's handling of arbitration but, rather, involve grievance handling prior to arbitration.
See Herman, supra note 39, at 651 & n.2 6 8.
45. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Gardner-Denver and its progeny are not § 301 cases. However, the policies outlined in the
case affect a § 301 analysis. The Lingle Court relied in part on these cases in
holding that federal law did not preempt the state law claim in Lingle. Thus, an
understanding of Gardner-Denverand its progeny is useful in understanding the
Lingle analysis, For a discussion of Lingle, see infra notes 121-54 and accompanying text. The Gardner-Denveranalysis has been applied in other cases involving
federal statutes.
For example, in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728
(1981), the Court held that a binding arbitration clause and the arbitrator's prior
decision did not preclude a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claim. Id. at 745.
The Court stated that "statute[s] designed to provide minimum substantive
guarantees" are not suited for binding resolution by arbitration. Id. at 737. The
Court reasoned that the statutory enforcement scheme granted nonwaivable
rights of action to individuals that take precedence over conflicting provisions in
a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 740-41.
The Court rejected preclusion of a statutory claim, if the employee submitted the claim to arbitration, for three reasons: (1) because unions, focused on
maximizing overall compensation in processing grievances, could act in good
faith to decline to process some individual grievance despite the breach of FLSA
rights; (2) arbitrators may lack familiarity with FLSA principles or be prevented
by the collective bargaining agreement from following them; and (3) arbitration
procedures are less protective of individual statutory rights and arbitrators may
be unable to grant relief available under FLSA. Id. at 739-45.
In McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984), the Court held
that an arbitrator's decision did not have collateral estoppel or resjudicata effect
in a subsequent suit for damages based on § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 289. The Court offered four reasons why the arbitration
procedure is not adequate to allow such preclusive effect: (1) arbitrators lack
expertise in handling the "complex legal questions that arise in section 1983
actions"; (2) an arbitrator's authority is derived from the labor contract which
may not allow enforcement of § 1983; (3) the union's interest may conflict with
that of the individual employee; and (4) arbitral fact finding was not an adequate
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Co.4 1 In Gardner-Denver,the Court held that an arbitrator's prior finding
in a race discrimination suit did not preclude a subsequent Title VII
suit.4 7 The Court stated that the two federal policies-in favor of arbitration of labor disputes and against discriminatory employment practices-could best be accommodated by allowing pursuit of a remedy
under both the grievance-arbitration clause and a Title VII cause of action. 48 The Court gave two primary reasons for allowing a statutory
claim under Title VII after an arbitrator's finding: (1) procedurally, Title VII vests federal courts with plenary powers to enforce statutory requirements; and (2) Congress intended Title VII to supplement, rather
than supplant, other laws and institutions relating to employment
substitute for the judicial fact-finding anticipated by Congress in creating
§ 1983. Id. at 289-92.
See also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557 (1987) (Railway Labor Act arbitration provisions not preclusive of action under Federal Employers' Liability Act).
46. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). In Gardner-Denver,Alexander, a black man, was initially hired to perform maintenance work and subsequently was promoted to a
trainee drill operator. Id. at 38. Alexander was discharged for allegedly producing too many defective parts. Id. He filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement stating that he had been "unjustly discharged," but he did
not explicitly claim that racial discrimination motivated that discharge. Id. at 39.
The collective bargaining agreement contained three provisions relating to discharge. First, the company retained "the right to hire, suspend or discharge
[employees] for proper cause." Id. Second, the agreement contained a provision providing that "there shall be no discrimination against any employee on
account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or ancestry." Id. Finally,
another provision stated that "[n]o employee will be discharged, suspended or
given a written warning notice except for just cause." Id.
The agreement also contained an arbitration clause which set forth the
steps in the grievance procedure. Id. at 40-41. The final step in the procedure
was compulsory arbitration where the arbitrator's decision would be "final and
binding" upon the parties. Id. at 41-42. Alexander raised his claim of racial
discrimination in the final pre-arbitration stage. Id. at 42. The arbitrator ruled
that Alexander had been "discharged for just cause" with no reference to Alexander's claim of racial discrimination. Id.
47. Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 59-60. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982), was enacted to ensure "equality of employment
opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at
44 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) and
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)). A violation of Title
VII can be proved either under a disparate treatment theory as in ,IcDonnell
Douglas or a disparate impact theory as in Griggs. H. PERRIrr, supra note 15, at
45-46. Title VII has two procedural stages: the first is an administrative stage
and the second a judicial stage with de novo review by federal courts. Id. at 4647. An employee who wishes to assert a Title VII claim must file her claim with a
state administrative agency and, subsequently, with a federal administrative
agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Id. The
EEOC has a specified period in which to either seek a conciliation agreement
from the employer, issue a right-to-sue letter which permits the individual to file
suit or file suit on behalf of the charging party. Id. at 47.
48. Gardner-Denver.415 U.S. at 59-60.
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discrimination. 4 9
The Court stated that the doctrine of election of remedies 5 1did not
apply in this situation because the employee sought vindication of a contractual right by submitting a grievance to arbitration, whereas under
Title VII the employee asserted an "independent statutory right[] accorded by Congress." ' 5 1 The Court rejected the proposition that Alexander waived his Title VII cause of action by accepting protections
under the collective bargaining agreement, stating that this substantive
right was not the type of right which could be waived. 52 The Court dismissed the lower courts' reasoning that to allow an employee to bring
his claim in both the arbitral and judicial forums would be unfair to the
employer because only the employer would be bound by the arbitral
award. 53 The Court stated that an action under Title VII is not a review
of the arbitrator's decision, but rather a statutory right independent of
the arbitration process. 54 As to whether the employee's double bite at
the apple would undermine the employer's incentive to arbitrate, the
Court asserted that the employer's primary incentive to arbitrate-the
union's promise not to strike-is not undermined by allowing the em55
ployee a judicial remedy under Title VII.

Finally, the Court rejected the employer's suggestion that federal
courts should defer to arbitral decisions on discrimination claims. 5"
The Court asserted that arbitral processes are not appropriate forums
for final resolution of rights created by Title VII because (1) the arbitrator's role and special competence is the "law of the shop, not the law of
the land," (2) the factfinding process in arbitration is not equivalent to
49. Id. at 47-49.
50. The Court stated that the doctrine of election of remedies applies to
"situations where an individual pursues remedies that are legally or factually
inconsistent." Id. at 49 (footnote omitted).
51. Id. at 49-50. The Court analogized this situation to the procedure
under the NLRA where disputes may involve both contractual and statutory
rights. Id. at 50.
52. Id. at 51. The Court distinguished between rights capable of waiver and
those rights which are not, stating: "[Rlights ...conferred on employees collectively to foster the processes of bargaining ... may be exercised or relinquished
by the union .... [Title VII rights] can form no part of the collective bargaining
process since waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional
purpose behind Title VII." Id.
53. Id. at 54.
54. Id. Thus, the Court stated that there was no unfairness to the employer
because "Title VII does not provide employers with a cause of action against
employees. [A]n employer cannot be the victim of discriminatory practices." Id.
55. Id. at 54-55.
56. Id. at 55-59. Gardner-Denverproposed that federal courts should defer
to arbitral decisions where: "(i) the claim was before the arbitrator; (ii) the collective-bargaining agreement prohibited the form of discrimination charged in
the suit under Title VII; and (iii) the arbitrator has authority to rule on the claim
and to fashion a remedy." Id. at 55-56 (footnote omitted). This proposal is
analogous to the NLRB's policy of deferral. Id. at 56 n. 17.
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judicial factfinding, and (3) the procedures of arbitration are not
57
equivalent to those of the judicial forum.
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts58 and Fort Halifax
Packing Co. v. Coyne, 5 1' when confronted with determining whether federal statutes preempted state statutes that affected terms of collective
bargaining agreements, the Supreme Court extended its reasoning in
Gardner-Denver. The Court also applied this reasoning when analyzing a
state law claim in Lingle;6 ° therefore, the analysis used in the two recent
Supreme Court decisions is useful in understanding the Lingle decision.
In Metropolitan Life the Supreme Court held that section 301 did not
preempt a state-mandated health benefit law."' The Court addressed
the issue of the state law's interference with substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements, stating that "[t]he NLRA is concerned primarily with establishing an equitable process for determining terms and
conditions of employment, and not with particular substantive terms of
the bargain that is struck. ' ' 62 The Court then extended the reasoning of
Gardner-Denverand stated that state minimum labor standards give individual rights independent of the collective bargaining agreement and,
thus, have only an indirect effect on the policies behind the NLRA."'3
The Court concluded that the purposes of the NLRA would not be furthered if unionized employees were not allowed the benefit of state la57. Id. at 57-58. The Court noted that in arbitration proceedings the record is not as complete, the rules of evidence do not apply, and procedures such
as discovery and cross-examination are often limited or unavailable. Id. The
Court also rejected as a solution the deferral standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 58 (citing Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972)
(allowing deference to decision of arbitrator in Title VII actions in certain explicitly defined situations)).
The Court stated that a deferral rule might adversely affect the arbitration
system in two ways: (1) by making the system more complex, expensive and
time-consuming in order to insure effectuation of Title VII rights; and (2) by
lessening the possibility of voluntary compliance or settlement of Title VII
claims because employees may elect to bypass arbitration. Id. at 59.
58. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
59. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
60. For a discussion of the facts and holding in Lingle, see infra notes 121-54
and accompanying text.
61. In .lelropolitan Life, the Massachusetts Attorney General brought suit
against two insurance carriers for declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce a
state statute requiring minimum mental health care coverage for employees insured under a general insurance policy, accident or sickness insurance policy, or
an employee health care plan that covers hospital and surgical expenses. MVetropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 727, 734. The Court dealt with two preemption issues in
Mletropolitan Life: preemption tinder ERISA and under the NLRA. The Court
held that ERISA did not preempt the Massachusetts statute because the statute
was a "law which regulates insurance" which would not fall within ERISA. Id. at
758.
62. Id. at 753.
63. Id. at 755 (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728
(1981)). For a discussion of Barrentieand Gardner-Denver,see supra notes 45-57
and accompanying text.
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64

bor regulations imposing minimal standards.
The Supreme Court also held, in Fort Halifax, that section 301 did
not preempt a Maine statute requiring one-time severance pay for employees. 65 There, the Court concluded that preemption was not required because the state statute contained "a minimum labor standard
that does not intrude upon the collective bargaining process.""6"
Although the Court acknowledged that the Maine statute gave employees something they otherwise would have bargained for and, under the
statute, could still bargain for, the Court stated that "[i]f impasse is
reached ... state law determines the right of employees to a certain level
of severance pay.'"67 In both Metropolitan Life and Fort Halifax the Court
stressed the fact that the establishment of labor standards fell within the
traditional police power of the state and, thus, preemption in this area
should not be "lightly inferred."" 81
C.

Section 301 Preemption and State Tort Actions

A section 301 case generally arises as a contract claim with one
party to the collective bargaining agreement asserting that the agreement has been violated."!' The previously discussed policies underlying
section 301 and articulated by the Supreme Court were developed in a
64. Velropofilan Life, 471 U.S. at 755-56 (citing Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 39).
The Court stated that "[nlo incompatibility exists, therefore, between federal
rules designed to restore the equality of bargaining power, and state or federal
legislation that imposes minimal substantive requirements on contract terms negotiated ... so long as the purpose of the state legislation is not incompatible with
these general goals of the NLRA." Id. at 754-55 (emphasis added).
Further, the Court stated: "It would turn the policy that animated the Wagner Act on its head to understand it to have penalized workers who have chosen
to join a union by preventing them from benefiting from state labor regulations
imposing minimal standards on nonunion employers." Id.
65. 482 U.S. 1 (1987). In Fort Halifax, terminated employees of a closed
poultry and processing plant brought suit seeking severance pay under a Maine
statute providing one-lime severance pay for employees not covered by a contract dealing with severance pay. Id. at 4. Under authority granted by the Maine
statute, the state Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards filed suit to enforce
the law. Id. The Director's suit superseded the employees' previously filed suit.
Id.
66. Id. at 7. The Court also addressed the issue of ERISA preemption and
held the statute was not preempted by ERISA because the statute "neither establishes, nor requires an employer to maintain, an employee welfare benefit
'plan' under that federal statute." Id.
67. Id. at 21. The Court further stated that the fact that "a state statute
pertains to matters over which the parties are free to bargain cannot support a
claim of pre-emption, for 'there is nothing in the NLRA . . . which expressly
forecloses all state regulatory power with respect to those issues ... that may be
the subject of collective bargaining.' " Id. at 21-22 (quoting Malone v. White
Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1978)).
68. Id. at 21; Iletropolitrp Life, 471 U.S. at 758.
69. R. GORMAN, stpra note 3, at 547.
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contract action context. 70 In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 7 1 the Supreme
Court explicitly interpreted section 301 preemption for the first time in
the context of a state tort action, as opposed to a contract action based
on a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. 7 2 In Allis-Chalmers, the Court held "that when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made
between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must be treated as a
[section] 301 claim . . . or dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract law." 73 However, the Court stated that not all disputes relating to
employment were preempted. 74 Only rights which were capable of consensual waiver were preempted, as opposed to an individual's substantive rights derived from an independent body of law that could not be
avoided by contractual agreement. 7 5 The Court stated that the focus of
70. For a discussion of the policies underlying § 301, see supra notes 21-42
and accompanying text.
71. 471 U.S. 202 (1985). Allis-Chalmers involved the state tort of bad faith
handling of an employee's claim under a disability insurance plan. Id. at 203.
The insurance plan was included in the collective bargaining agreement, but the
employee did not seek redress through the grievance channels created by the
agreement. Id. at 204-06. The issue for the Court was whether the state law tort
claim "would frustrate the federal-labor contract scheme established in § 301"
and would thus be preempted by § 301. Id. at 209.
72. See Herman, supra note 39, at 626.
73. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220. The Court stated:
[Questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed,
and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of
the agreement, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law,
whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort. Any other result would elevate
form over substance and allow parties to evade the requirements of
§ 301 by relabeling their contract claims as claims for tortious breach of
contract.
Id. at 211.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 213 n.8 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974)). In Gardner-Denver, the Court distinguished rights which could be waived
by contract from an individual's substantive rights which cannot be waived.
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51. For a discussion of Gardner-Denver, see supra
notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
One commentator suggests that Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985), and Allis-Chalners read together, mark a shift in emphasis in labor law preemption:
The Court's express incorporation of Gardner-Denver and Bao-eialine Iv.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 471 U.S. 728 (1981)] 1 in both Allis-Chalmers
and Metropolitan Life] demonstrates that the touchstone of preemption
is the distinction between collective rights traceable to the agreement,
and nonwaivable, individually-based rights that originate in state law
independently of the agreement ....
'his incorporation promoted]
[tihe Court's vision of a different industrial order in which substantive
rights created by states play an increasingly salient role in protecting
individual workers ....
Herman, supra note 39, at 634. For a discussion of ,Weropolital Life, see supra
notes 58-64 and accompanying text. However, Vetropolilan Life has not been
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the analysis must be on whether a state claim confers independent, nonnegotiable state law rights or whether evaluation of the claim is "inextricably intertwined" with consideration of the terms of the labor contract. 76 The Court cautioned that not every state law suit that relates to
a provision in a collective bargaining agreement or the parties to such an
agreement is preempted by section 301. Rather, "[t]he full scope of the
pre-emptive effect of federal labor-contract law remains to be fleshed
77
out on a case-by-case basis."
III.

THE CIRCUIT COURTS' ANALYSES

The distinction between state tort and contract actions under collective bargaining agreements complicated the preemption anialysis for
courts under section 301. Courts had particular difficulty when deciding
whether section 301 preempted a state wrongful discharge action or
some other state law claim based on the employment relationship.
Historically, the common law rule in the United States was that employment for an unspecified period of time was employment-at-will and
was terminable at any time by either party. 78 Over the years, however,
exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine have been created by federal and state legislatures, as well as by state courts. 71 Although regulaused by the majority of the courts of appeals when analyzing whether state law
tort actions are preempted. Herman, supra note 39, at 640.
76. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213. "If the state tort law purports to define
the meaning of the contract relationship, that law is pre-empted." Id. Further,
the Court stated labor contracts may create implied rights, and it is a question of
federal contract interpretation whether implied obligations exist. Id. at 215. In
Allis-Chalmers, the right asserted-damages for the tort of bad faith handling of
an insurance claim-was derived from the contract's provision providing disability insurance and was defined by the contractual obligation of good faith. Id. at
217-18. Therefore, the Court found that the bad faith handling tort was rooted
in contract and could have been pled as a § 301 claim. Id. "If the policies that
animate § 301 are to be given their proper range .. .the pre-emptive effect of
§ 301 must extend beyond suits alleging contract violations." Id. at 210. Because the complaint was really a contract claim, it should have been dismissed
for failure to make use of the agreed upon grievance procedures or dismissed as
preempted by § 301. Id. at 220-21.
77. Id. The Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed Allis-Chalmers. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987) (employee's
state tort claim preempted because claim involved interpretation of collective
bargaining agreement). Cf. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987)
(employees' claim that employer breached individual contract not preempted
because claim did not implicate collective bargaining agreement).
78. See H. PERR1rr7, supra note 15, at 7-12; H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877) (Wood's treatise is where rule first
appeared); Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will
Rule, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976).

79. For a discussion of the erosion of employment-at-will, see Weeks, supra
note 8, at 607-21 (listing 76 law review articles on wrongful discharge actions
and erosion of employment-at-will doctrine). The case said to be the beginning
of the development of wrongful dismissal common law exceptions to employment at will is Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396,
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tion of the employment relationship is within a state's traditional police
1
power, 8°
actions arising out of the employment relationship implicate
federal labor policy when the employment relationship is also governed
by a collective bargaining agreement. 8 '
This tension, between state law claims and section 301, has caused a
split among the circuit courts in deciding the preemptive effect of section 301 in the context of state law wrongful discharge actions or similar
claims. The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Third
Circuits have held that section 301 does not preempt a unionized employee's state law claim.8 2 Conversely, the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth
8 3
Circuits have held that it does.
A.

Section 301-Not Preemptive

The Second and Third Circuits base their decisions that section 301
does not preempt a unionized employee's state-law wrongful discharge
claim on the independence of the claim from the collective bargaining
agreement. The Third Circuit concluded that section 301 did not preempt a unionized worker's state law retaliatory discharge claim in Her174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959), where the court recognized a contract
cause of action for an employer's breach of good faith and fair dealing when an
employee was fired for refusing to commit perjury. Weeks, supra note 8, at 61415. See also H. PERRIrr, supra note 15, at 41-117 (listing contract and tort theories of recovery for wrongful discharge); Mauk, Wi'rongful Discharge: The Erosion of
100 1ears of Emplo4yer Privilege, 21 IDAHO L. REV. 201 (1985) (same).
One general area of exception to the employment-at-will doctrine has been
through state public policy tort theories. H. PERRITr, supra note 15, at 244
(courts in all but six states recognize private right of action when adherence to
employment-at-will rule would jeopardize a specific public policy interest). Public policy torts fall into three general groups: employee dismissals in violation of
a statutory grant of rights; employee dismissals for engaging in activities outside
the workplace affirmatively protected by public policy; and employee dismissals
for opposing employer conduct that contravened public policy. Id. at 254-55.
Because courts initially developed these exceptions to protect those employees
who did not have the protections of unions and collective bargaining agreements, many courts have declined to extend an action based on these theories to
employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement. See Summers, Individnal Protection Against Unjust Dismissak Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 491-99
(1976) (to an extent, state law actions have narrowed traditional gulf in benefits
and protections that have existed between unionized employees and employees
without protection of collective bargaining agreement).
80. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 6-13, at 437.
81. "Approximately 22% of the American workforce is covered by union
contracts." P. WEINER, S. BOMPEY & M. BRITTAIN, WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
CLAIMS, A PREVENTIVE APPROACH 15 (1986) (citation omitted). The collective
bargaining agreement will normally have provisions governing grounds for dismissal with the principle of "just cause" required for discharge contained in almost all agreements. H. PERRITT, supra note 15, at 128.
82. For a further discussion of these decisions, see infra notes 84-98 and
accompanying text.
83. For a further discussion of these decisions, see infra notes 99-120 and
accompanying text.
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ring v. Prince Macaroni, Inc.14 The court of appeals looked to the New
8 5"
Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Pierce v. Ortho PhanaceuticalCorp.
In Pierce, the court recognized a common law exception to employmentat-will.8 ' Although the New Jersey court's discussion in Pierce seemed to
limit the common law action to at-will employees,8 7 the Third Circuit
concluded that an action for wrongful discharge in retaliation for filing a
worker's compensation claim should be available to both at-will employees and those covered by collective bargaining agreements. 8" The court
84. 799 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986). In Hering, a diversity suit in federal district court, an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement with a
"just and proper cause" provision for dismissal brought a state tort action for
retaliatory discharge after allegedly being dismissed for filing a worker's compensation claim. Id. at 121. The state's worker's compensation statute did not
create a private cause of action, thus the employee relied on the common law
tort action of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Id. at 122.
The district court predicted that the Supreme Court of New Jersey, if confronted with the question, would hold that § 301 preempts the action because
employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement containing 'just cause"
provisions do not enjoy the common law right of action. Herring v. Prince
Foods-Canning Div., 611 F. Supp. 177, 180 (D.N.J. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Herring
v. Prince Macaroni, Inc., 799 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986). The district court then
held that the action could not continue as a § 301 action because the employee
had not exhausted the grievance-arbitration procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 181-82.
85. 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). In Pierce, a medical doctor was discharged for refusing to work on development of a product containing saccharin.
Id. at 59, 417 A.2d at 507. The doctor alleged that she was entitled to damages
for her discharge because she was fired for refusing to follow a course of action
which was contrary to the Hippocratic oath, her own ethical standards and federal and state laws governing public health and well-being. Id.
86. Id. at 67, 417 A.2d at 509 (1980). The Pierce court surveyed other
state's common-law exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine and held that
wrongfully discharged employees have a common law cause of action in contract
and tort where they are discharged in violation of a clear mandate of public
policy. Id. at 67-68, 417 A.2d at 509.
The district court found Hernig distinguishable from Pierce because the employee in Hening was covered by a collective bargaining agreement containing a
"just cause" provision. Herring, 611 F. Supp. at 179. The district court looked
to the decision in Pierce and stated: "The decision is predicated, it seems, on the
absence of any other remedies for this class of employees and the realization that, in
limited circumstances there must be limits to an employer's authority over its
employees." Id. (emphasis in original). Since the employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement could rely on a contractual remedy based on the
agreement, the district court predicted that the New Jersey Supreme Court
would not extend the Pierce cause of action to such an employee. Id. at 180.
87. Pierce, 84 N.J. at 68, 417 A.2d at 509.
88. Herring, 799 F.2d at 123. The court pointed to another New jersey decision cited in Pierce which did not differentiate between at-will and contractual
employees and stated that it is "well established that an employee has a cause of
action where he is discharged in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation
claim, even if the worker's compensation statute does not provide such a remedy." Id. (quoting Pierce, 84 N.J. at 68, 417 A.2d at 510 (citing Lally v.
Copygraphics, 173 NJ. Super. 162, 413 A.2d 960 (App. Div. 1980), aff'd, 85 N.J.
668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981))). In alfirming Laly, the New Jersey Supreme Court

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss5/10

18

Nofer: Preemption of State Law Claims after Lingle v. Norge

1989]

1053

NOTE

reasoned that the worker's compensation statute is applicable to all employees, and contractual employees as a class should not be limited to
remedies under the collective bargaining agreement. 8 9 The court also
noted that worker's compensation rights are rooted in state law, not the
collective bargaining agreement. 90 The court distinguished between
rights created by state statute, such as those in the case before it, and
common law exceptions to employment-at-will, and refused to predict
whether employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement would
be afforded the common law cause of action created in Pierce.91)
In Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney,' 2 the Second Circuit held that section 301 did not preempt a unionized worker's state law retaliatory discharge claim. First, the court stated that the worker's claim was
independent of the collective bargaining agreement because the claim
did not turn on interpretation of the agreement.11" In reasoning that the
claim was independent the court looked to what both Baldracchi and
Pratt & Whitney would have to show at trial, and determined that liability would not be decided by reference to the collective bargaining agreement.9 4 Further, the Court asserted that the rights under the state
statute could not be waived and, thus, determination of the claim was
focused on the importance of statutory objectives in the worker's compensation
statute and stated that a "common law action for wrongful discharge in this context will effectuate" these objectives. Id. (citing LaIly, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d
1317).
89. Herring, 799 F.2d at 123-24.

90. Id. at 124 n.2. The court acknowledged the overriding importance of
an employee's right to seek worker's compensation claims without fear of dismissal whether or not the employee is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 123.
91. Id. at 124.
92. 814 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2819 (1988). The
facts in Baldracchiare strikingly similar to those in Herring. In Baldracchi, a union-

ized employee claimed wrongful discharge under a state statute which prohibits
employers from discharging employees for filing a worker's compensation claim.
Id. at 103. The defendant employer removed the action to federal district court
under § 301 of the LMRA. Id. at 104. Baldracchi, the employee, moved to remand the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The district court held
the employee's action preempted by § 301 and dismissed the action for failure
to state a claim because Baldracchi did not first exhaust the grievance-arbitration
procedures in the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
93. Id. at 105-06.
94. Id. at 105. "At trial, Baldracchi would have to present a prima facie case
that she was in fact fired for filing a workers' compensation claim." Id. (citing 2A

A.

LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §

68.36(c) (1986)). Pratt &

Whitney would have to demonstrate that the discharge was for another legitimate reason. Id. Pratt & Whitney argued that in determining whether the discharge was for a legitimate reason the court would have to interpret the "just
cause" provision in the collective bargaining agreement. ld. The court disagreed, noting that although Pratt & Whitney would have to show that the reason was "more than a pretext," it would not have to show that this reason
amounted to "just cause" under the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
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not dependent on the collective bargaining agreement. 9 5
The court pointed to other reasons why section 301 did not preempt the state tort action. The court acknowledged that the determination of the relief to which Baldracchi might be entitled, if she prevailed,
might involve examination of the collective bargaining agreement.!"!
However, the court found this dependence on the agreement not so
"substantial" as to mandate preemption under section 301._7 The court
also noted that preempting the state action would not further NLRA
policy because it would result in less protection for employees covered
8
by collective bargaining agreements. 9
B.

Section 301-Preemptive

The Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits have reached a contrary result and have held that section 301 does preempt state law claims. The
courts have reasoned that the state claims were substantially dependent
on the collective bargaining agreement and thus were preempted.
Illustrative of this reasoning is the Eighth Circuit's decision in Johnson v. Hussman Corp. '!' In Johnson, the court held that section 301 pre-

95. Id. The court noted that the Supreme Court had previously stated that
§ 301 does not grant the parties to a collective bargaining agreement the power
to contract for something that is illegal under state law. Id. (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 212 (1985)). Thus, even if the collective
bargaining agreement had allowed Pratt & Whitney the ability to discharge an
employee for filing a worker's compensation claim, such a provision would have
not affected Baldracchi's claim under the statute. Id. "Thus it is difficult to see
how determination of that claim can be said to depend on the collective bargaining agreement." Id. The court also compared the statute in Baldracchi to the
federal statute in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), as involving unwaivable rights. For a discussion of Gardner-Denver,see supra notes 4657 and accompanying text.
96. Baldracchi, 814 F.2d at 106.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 107 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724, 756 (1985)). For a discussion of Aletropolitan Life, see supra notes 58-68 and
accompanying text.
99. 805 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1986). Injohnson, the employee was injured on
the job and, shortly thereafter, discharged for allegedly repeatedly violating
posted safety rules. Id. at 796. The employee was covered by a collective bargaining agreement which prohibited discharge except for just cause and established grievance-arbitration procedures. Id. The employee's union filed a
grievance protesting his discharge. Id. At the third phase of the grievance procedure the employer denied the grievance, and the union decided not to take it
to arbitration. Id. The employee then filed an action in state court against the
union and the employer alleging conspiracy, breach of the collective bargaining
agreement by the employer and breach of the duty of fair representation by the
union. Id. The employer and the union removed the action to federal district
court. Id. The employee amended his complaint alleging only that the employer had fired him in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim. Id.
The employer then filed a motion for summary judgment or dismissal. Id. The
district court treated the state law claim as a § 301 claim and dismissed the claim
as time-barred by the six-month statute of limitations. Id. For a case holding
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empted a unionized worker's state law claim for retaliatory discharge for
filing a worker's compensation claim.' 0 0 The court reasoned that the
retaliatory discharge claim was really a claim for wrongful discharge in
violation of the collective bargaining agreement.h)I Thus, the court
found the claim preempted because resolution of the retaliatory discharge claim was "substantially dependent" upon analysis of the collective bargaining agreement. 102
Similarly, in Ogelsby v. RCA Corp., I10 3 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that section 301 preempted a unionized worker's
state law claims. In Ogelsby, the court stated that the "plaintiff has simply
alleged a cause of action for wrongful discharge and if shown to be in
violation of a collective bargaining agreement subject to Section 301 ...
[then] the action arises under federal law [and the state law is preempted]."'' 1 4 The court reasoned that once the district court ascerthat the statute of limitations for § 301 claims is six months, see DelCostello v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
100. Johnson, 805 F.2d at 797.
101. Id. (citing Moore v. General Motors Corp., 739 F.2d 311, 315-17 (8th
Cir. 1984) (rejecting contract and tort distinction), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099
(1985)) (additional citation omitted).
102. Id. (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985)).
For a discussion of Allis-Chalmers, see supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
103. 752 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1985). In Ogelsby, the employee filed a threecount complaint in which he alleged that his employer discharged him for refusing to perform a task in violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
which required certain tools and clothing for the assigned task. Id. at 274. The
employee filed in state court, and the case was removed to federal district court
by RCA. Id. The employee was covered by a collective bargaining agreement
with a "just cause" provision. Id. The district court held that the action was a
§ 301 action which was barred by the six-month statute of limitations. Id. at 27576. The district court did not discuss the exhaustion requirement as enunciated
in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1986). For a discussion of
,lladdox and this requirement, see supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
104. Ogelsby, 752 F.2d at 276. The court stated that "when the pre-emptive
effect of federal legislation is so complete as to exclude from application all state
law on the subject, a case is removable [from state to federal court] regardless of
the manner in which it was alleged in the state court." Id. However, the court
noted: "[Wihere the right sought to be vindicated in a state court is based on a
claim rooted in state policy which in no way conflicts with federal labor law policy the action is not removable." Id. at 276 n.3 (citing Garibaldi v. Lucky Food
Stores, 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984) (employee discharged for not delivering
contaminated milk stated state public policy tort action which was not removable
and, thus, not preempted)). For a further discussion of removal, see Caterpillar
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987). In Caterpillarthe Court stated:
[lit is now settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court
on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of pre-emption
.... [However,] [o]n occasion, the Court has concluded that the preemptive force of a statute is so "extraordinary" that it "converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for
purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule."
Id. at 393 (citations omitted). See generally Twitchell, CharacterizingFederal Claims:
Preemption, Removal, and the Arising- 'nderJunrisdiction of the Federal Courts, 54 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 812 (1986).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989

21

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 5 [1989], Art. 10

1056

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34: p. 1035

tained that the employee was a member of a union covered by a
collective bargaining agreement and the employer's business was interstate in nature, it "followed ineluctably" that the employee's claim arose
under section 301.11 -5 The Seventh Circuit similarly held a unionized
worker's state law claim preempted in Vantine v. Elkart Brass Manufacturing Co.1 ° (7 In V1antine, the court stated that the Indiana Supreme Court

had created the tort action for retaliatory discharge for filing a worker's
compensation claim only for at-will employees.' 0 7 The court stated that
an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement did not need
this protection because the goals and policies of the Indiana Workers'
Compensation Act were protected by the collective bargaining agreement.11 8 The court pointed to the applicable statute which specifically
stated:

-[N]o contract . . . shall, in any manner, operate to relieve any

employer in whole or in part of any obligation created by [the worker's
compensation act]."'io9 The collective bargaining agreement must com105. Ogelsby, 752 F.2d at 278. Having concluded that this was a § 301 claim,
the court held that removal to the federal court was proper and the claim was
preempted.
106. 762 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1985). Vantine, an employee of Elkhart Brass,
was a member of a union covered by a collective bargaining agreement which
contained a "just and proper cause" standard for employee dismissal and also
contained a grievance procedure which was to be the "sole method of settling
disputes." Id. at 514. Vantine suffered permanent injury while performing his
job and filed a worker's compensation claim. Elkhart Brass placed Vantine on
layoff status, which interfered with his seniority rights, and eventually terminated him. Id. at 514-15. Vantine's union, alleging a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement, filed and processed a grievance through the first three
steps of the grievance procedure. Id. at 515. The union subsequently submitted
the grievance to arbitration when the grievance remained unresolved. Id. The
arbitrator issued an award for Elkhart Brass. Id. Vantine then filed suit in state
court alleging retaliatory discharge, tortious interference with Vantine's contract
rights and breach of contract. Id. at 515-16. Elkhart Brass successfully removed
the case to federal district court on the basis that the claim was governed by
§ 301. Id. at 516. The district court judge dismissed the case against Elkhart
Brass for failing to state a breach of the collective bargaining agreement under
§ 301. Id. On appeal, the plaintiff alleged that federal courts had no jurisdiction
over the claim. Id.
107. Id. at 517.
108. Id. The court stated that an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement would be protected from a retaliatory discharge because "the
termination of an employee in retaliation for filing a workmen's compensation
claim would not be considered for 'just cause.' " Id.
109. Id. (quoting IND. CODE § 22-3-2-15 (1971)). The court further cited
another Indiana statute which stated that "[e]very contract of service between
any employer and employee covered by [the Worker's Compensation Act] ...
shall be presumed to have been made subject to the provisions of this act . ... "
Id. (quoting IND. CODE § 22-3-2-4 (1971)). The court stated, "Under Indiana
law, a collective bargaining agreement, which as a contract must comply with
[these two statutes], cannot operate to relieve the employer of its duty to compensate employer for work-related injuries . . . by allowing the employer to discharge an employee for filing workmen's compensation claims." Id. (citation
omitted).
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ply with the statute, thus, the court concluded that the agreement would
adequately protect the employee's right not to be discharged in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim.I 10 The court stated that
an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement may instead
pursue a contract remedy which allows the employee to "exercise his
right to workmen's compensation in an unfettered fashion without being
subject to reprisal." II
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that section 301
preempted a unionized employee's state wrongful discharge action in
DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Systems Inc. 1 2 In DeSoto, the employee had been
discharged for refusing to do something he mistakenly believed was illegal. ' 13 The employee had gone through the grievance procedure specified in the collective bargaining agreement and his discharge was
sustained.' '4 The court acknowledged that "it [is] possible to say that
[DeSoto's wrongful discharge claim] is distinct from any claim based on
the collective bargaining agreement."' 15 Nevertheless, the court stated
that permitting this state action may eviscerate a central tenet of federal
contract law by facilitating "an end run around the grievance procedure.,"' Il The Ninth Circuit also held that section 301 preempted state
claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation in Bale v. General Telephone Co. 1 17 There, the court reasoned that the employees' state claims
110. Id.
11. Id.
112. 820 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, vacated in light of Lingle, 108
S. Ct. 2813 (1988).
113. Id. at 1435-36. The court noted that DeSoto was mistaken in his belief
that the act was illegal and, therefore, "[hle was not acting in defense of a public
policy of the state . . .but incorrectly asserting his own interpretation of the
law." Id.at 1438.
114. Id. at 1436.
115. Id. at 1437.
116. Id. (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985)). Further, the court stated: "It is just this kind of dispute over what is the appropriate
management response to difficult behavior by an employee that should be the
subject of a grievance procedure .... Harmonious relations between management and labor depend on the grievance procedure being final in this kind of
dispute." Id. at 1438.
117. 795 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1986). In Bale, two employees alleged that at
the time of hiring they were told they would be "temporary" employees for six
months and then become "regular" employees. Id. at 777. The employees al-

leged that they believed that the rights and privileges of regular employment

would vest automatically at the end of six months. Id. After the six-month pe-

riod passed, one of the employees asked the union to file a grievance on her
behalf to gain recognition of her regular status. Id. The union refused, and the
employees were discharged more than a year after their hiring. Id. The employees filed a claim against General Telephone in state court alleging breach of oral
contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation and a § 301 claim for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement; they also brought suit against the union. Id.
General Telephone removed the case to federal district court where the court
granted General Telephone's and the union's summary judgment motions. Id.
at 777-78. Plaintiff moved to amend the judgment for General Telephone, ask-
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would require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement because to prove their claims they would have to show that the terms of the
agreement differed from the individual contracts they believed they had
made.' 8 Citing Allis-Chalmers, the court stated that the preemptive effect of section 301 encompasses not only contract claims, but tort claims
that would frustrate the purposes of section 301.119 The court stated
that the plaintiffs stated tort actions " 'arose out of the same acts and
conduct which formed the basis of' their section 301 claim" and were
thus preempted by section 301.120
C.

The Resolution?

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lingle v. Norge Division of
Magic Chef Inc. 12 1 to resolve the conflict among the circuits.

12

2

The Lin-

gle Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and held that section 301 of the
LMRA preempted the application of state law only if such application
required the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.'12 3
In Lingle, Jonna Lingle was injured in the course of her employment
at a manufacturing plant in Illinois. 2 4 Lingle filed for benefits pursuant
to the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act to pay the medical expenses
which resulted from her injuries.' 2 5 Shortly thereafter, Lingle's employer fired her for filing a "false worker's compensation claim." 12" The
union representing Lingle filed a grievance pursuant to the collective
bargaining agreement which protected employees from discharge except for "just cause." 127 Ultimately, an arbitrator ruled in Lingle's favor
and ordered her reinstated with full back pay. ' 28 Meanwhile, Lingle had
ing the court to hold that the state law tort claims were not preempted by federal

law. Id. at 778. The district court denied the employees' motion and held the

state tort actions preempted. Id. The employees appealed only the denial of
their motion on the state tort actions. Id.
118. Id. at 780.
119. Id. (citing Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211).
120. Id. (citing Carter v. Smith Food King, 765 F.2d 916, 921 (9th Cir.
1985)). For another case in which the Ninth Circuit held a unionized employee's
state law contract and tort actions preempted by § 301, see Olguin v. Inspiration
Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1989) (state law contract, wrongful
discharge, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims preempted by § 301 because all claims actually
suits based on violations of collective bargaining agreement).
121. 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988).
122. Id. at 1879-80. For a discussion of the differing views among the circuits, see supra notes 84-120 and accompanying text.
123. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1885.
124. Id. at 1879.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. The collective bargaining agreement established a procedure for
arbitration of grievances which the parties followed. Id.
128. Id.
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also filed suit in state court alleging that she had been discharged for
2 z9
exercising her rights under the state worker's compensation laws.1
The employer, Magic Chef, removed the case to federal district court on
the basis of diversity of citizenship, and requested that the court either
dismiss the case since it was preempted by section 301 or stay the case
3t
pending completion of the arbitration. 0
The district court, relying on Allis-Chalmers, concluded that the
"claim for retaliatory discharge is 'inextricably intertwined' with the collective bargaining provision prohibiting wrongful discharge or discharge
without just cause."' 13 1 Thus, the district court granted Magic Chef's
13 2
motion to dismiss the case due to preemption.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.'13 3 The court looked to recent decisions in the Seventh Circuit
and concluded that the holdings were consistent, stating: "[C]laims of
retaliatory discharge brought by a worker who is covered by a collective
bargaining agreement are actually claims for wrongful discharge under
the collective bargaining agreement" and are preempted under section
301.134 The court stated that the state tort of retaliatory discharge was
"inextricably intertwined" with the collective bargaining agreement because "it implicate[d] the same analysis of the facts as would an inquiry
under the just cause provisions of the agreement."' 1 5 The court de129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 618 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (S.D. Ill.
1985), aff'd, 825 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988). The
court stated:
It is equally clear that such a tort claim would effect the "legal consequences [which] were intended to flow from breaches of [the] agreement." The parties have agreed to abide by the orderly mechanism for
grievance of wrongful discharge claims as set out in the collective bargaining agreement. Allowing an independent tort action for retaliatory
discharge would undermine the mutually agreed upon procedures provided for in that agreement.
Id. (citation omitted).
132. Id. Because the court concluded that the plaintiff's claim was essentially a § 301 claim, the court dismissed the claim for the plaintiff's failure to
exhaust her administrative remedies as required by Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1986). For a further discussion of Maddox, see supra notes
37-38 and accompanying text.
133. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987),
rev'd, 108 S.Ct. 1877 (1988).
134. Id. at 1041. The court thus concluded that its holding was "mandated
by prior cases in th[e] circuit." Id. (citing Mitchell v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers, Inc.,
772 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986); Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co., 762 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1985); Ogelsby v. RCA Corp., 752
F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1985)). For a discussion of Vanline and Ogelsby, see supra notes
103-11 and accompanying text.
135. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1046. The court stated that the state court "would
have to determine if the employee would have been discharged absent the statelaw-proscribed motive, which in turn would depend on whether the non-pro-
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clined to follow the Second and Third Circuits, and joined the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits in holding that the state tort of retaliatory discharge
was preempted under section 301.1 "
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Seventh Circuit and held that section 301 did not preempt Lingle's
claim)13 7 The Court noted that Illinois courts recognized the tort of
retaliatory discharge for filing a worker's compensation claim and had
extended this cause of action to employees covered by collective bargaining agreements. :31
The Court stated that neither the elements necessary to the retaliatory discharge action nor the employer's defense
required a court to interpret any term of a collective bargaining agreement.''" Because the state action required only factual inquiries and
did not depend on interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the Court asserted that the state action was "independent" for
purposes of section 301 preemption.1 4 ( The Court stated that even if a
scribed motive constituted 'just cause' under the collective bargaining agreement." Id.
136. Id. at 1047. The court cited Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney, 814 F.2d

102 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2819 (1988); Johnson v. Hussmann
Corp., 805 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1986); Herring v. Prince Macaroni, Inc., 799 F.2d
120 (3d Cir. 1986); Bale v. General Tel. Co., 795 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1986);

Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984). For a
discussion of these cases, see supra notes 92-120 and accompanying text. The
court also cited a Tenth Circuit case decided prior to Allis-Chaltners which agreed
with the decisions of the Second and Third Circuits. Id. (citing Peabody Galion
v. A.V. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981) (employee's retaliatory discharge
action not preempted)).
137. Lingle, 108 S.Ct. at 1883-85.
138. Id. at 1881-82 (citing Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 III. 2d 143,
473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985); Kelsay v. Motorola,
Inc., 74 Ill.
2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978)).
In Vidgett, the Illinois Supreme Court relied on the Gardner-Denverline of
cases to extend the common law tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a worker's
compensation claim to employees covered by collective bargaining agreements.
.lidgett, 105 Il1. 2d at 148, 473 N.E.2d at 1284 (citing Alexander v. GardnerDenver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974)). The dissent in Alidgett stated that the tort was
created to provide protection for at will employees only because a unionized
employee has protection from retaliatory discharge in the just cause provision.
Id. at 152, 473 N.E.2d at 1286 (Moran, J., dissenting). Further, the dissent argued that allowing union employees the benefit of this tort will undermine the
federal labor policy of arbitration as the preferred method of dispute resolution.
Id. (Moran, J., dissenting).
139. Lingle, 108 S.Ct. at 1882. The Court stated:
[T]o show retaliatory discharge, the plaintiff must set forth sufficient
facts from which it can be inferred that (1) he was discharged or
threatened with discharge and (2) the employer's motive in discharging
or threatening to discharge him was to deter him from exercising his
rights under the Act or to interfere with his exercise of those rights.
Id. (quoting Horton v. Miller Chemical Co., 776 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir.
1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1122)). The employer then must show a
nonretaliatory reason for the discharge. Id.

140. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss5/10

26

Nofer: Preemption of State Law Claims after Lingle v. Norge

19891

NOTE

1061

court must perform the same analysis of the same facts under both the
state claim and the collective bargaining agreement, section 301 does
not mandate preemption unless interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is required for the resolution of the state claim. 141
The Court in Lingle stated that its holding was consistent with the
policy of "fostering uniform, certain adjudication of disputes over the
meaning of collective-bargaining agreements." 14 2 The Court, citing Allis-Chalmers, emphasized the importance of preserving the effectiveness
of arbitration by not allowing an individual to sidestep the available
grievance procedures. 143 Contrary to its holding in Allis-Chalmers, the
Court stated that the fact that an action is non-negotiableor applicable to all
workers does not ensure its independence from the collective bargaining
agreement. 144 Furthermore the Court stated that its decision clearly left
the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements for arbitrators;
judges may determine questions of state law involving labor-management relations only if the state questions involve no interpretation of
45
collective bargaining agreements. 1
The Court also stated that allowing Lingle's state action was consistent with the policy of allowing "separate fonts of substantive rights to
remain unpre-empted by other federal labor-law statutes." 14 11 The
Court discussed other instances where it recognized that other substantive rights can exist in the labor-relations context without interpretation
of collective bargaining agreements. The Court pointed to several of its
prior decisions 14 7 where the Court held that individual employees are
not, because of the availability of arbitration, barred from bringing
claims under federal statutes. ' 4 8 The Court stated that the "theory running through these cases is that notwithstanding the strong policies encouraging arbitration, 'different considerations apply where the employee's
141. Id. at 1883.
142. Id. at 1884.
143. Id. (citing Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. 202).
144. Id. at 1882 n.7. In Allis-Chalmers, the Court stated that if state law
rights can be altered or waived, they are not independent of the contract. AllisChalmers, 471 U.S. at 213 (citing the Court's discussion in Alexander v. Gardner-

Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), regarding which rights are capable of waiver).
However, the Lingle Court noted: "It is conceivable that a state could create a
remedy that, although nonnegotiable, nonetheless turned on the interpretation
of a collective-bargaining agreement for its application. Such a remedy would
be preempted by § 301." Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1882 n.7. The Court further
stated that even if a law applies to all state workers but required interpretation of
a collective bargaining agreement in some instances, § 301 would preempt the
state law in these instances. Id.
145. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1884
146. Id.
147. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984); Barrentine
v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 4568 and accompanying text.
148. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1884-85.
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claim is based on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers.' ,,14" The Court reasoned that
these same considerations should also apply where state statutes establish minimum substantive guarantees. 1 50 The Court pointed to its recent decision in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne 151 where it held a state
statute was not preempted "since its establishment of a minimum labor
standard [did] not impermissibly intrude upon the collective-bargaining
process."1 5 2 Finally, the Court stated that although contractual protection may provide a remedy for conduct that also violates state law, the
existence or contour of the state action is not necessarily dependent
upon the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 153 This is so
because even if an arbitrator concludes that an agreement does not prohibit a particular discriminatory or retaliatory discharge, this conclusion
154
may not be consistent with a proper interpretation of state law.
IV.

ANALYSIS:

TENSION BETWEEN STATE LAW CLAIMS AND FEDERAL

LABOR POLICIES UNDERLYING SECTION

301

PREEMPTION

The Supreme Court's decision in Lingle did not clarify the Allis-Chalmers test for deciding the preemptive effect of section 301 on state law
claims. In fact, decisions in the courts of appeals following Lingle
demonstrate a continued confusion over the parameters of state law
claims and section 301 preemption. Further, the result in Lingle represents a departure from thirty years of Supreme Court pronouncements
regarding policies underlying 301 preemption. Lingle frustrates both
federal labor policies of uniform interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements and arbitration as the preferred method of dispute resolution. However, if Lingle is viewed as a narrow extension of the GardnerDenver line of exceptions to the federal labor policies of section 301, the
decision is more consistent with Supreme Court precedent.
149. Id. at 1884 (quoting Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480
U.S. 557, 564 (1987) (quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc.,
450 U.S. 728, 737 (1981))) (emphasis added by Lingle Court). The Court in Buell
held that the Railway Labor Act did not preempt a state statute providing severance benefits to employees in the event of a plant closing. Buell, 480 U.S. at 567.
150. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1885.
151. 482 U.S. I (1987). For a discussion of Fort Halifax, see supra notes 5968 and accompanying text.
152. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1885 (quoting Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 7). The
Court reemphasized that preemption should not be "lightly inferred" where a
state statute provides minimum substantive guarantees, because "the establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the state."
Id. (quoting Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 21).
153. Id.
154. Id. Thus the Court stated that a "typical" state case of discriminatory
or retaliatory discharge could be resolved without interpreting the "just cause"
language of a collective bargaining agreement. Id.
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Uniform Interpretation of Collective BargainingAgreements

One of the underlying policies of section 301 is the promotion of
uniform interpretation of labor contracts to ensure smooth negotiation
and administration of collective bargaining agreements. 155 By allowing
state courts to decide disputes which arise out of the employment relationship, Lingle frustrates this policy in two ways: (1) collective bargaining agreements will, in the first instance, be interpreted by courts, as
opposed to arbitrators; and (2) these interpretations will be based on
fifty different state law interpretations rather than a uniform body of fed56
eral common law.'
State contract and tort law serve the same function in the laborrelations context-to define the legal consequences of the employment
relationship.' 5 7 The Supreme Court has consistently held that section
301 mandates that all state contract law give way to federal law in interpreting labor contracts.' 15 8 In Allis-Chalmers, the Court recognized the
difficulty in distinguishing between contract and tort law in this context. 15 However, the Allis-Chalmers Court placed substance over form
and found that section 301 policies would be promoted only if provisions in collective bargaining agreements are defined by federal law, regardless of whether the action is called a tort or contract claim. '"o After
Lingle, state courts will define employment relationships created by collective bargaining agreements so long as the elements necessary to establish the state claim do not require literal interpretation of the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement, regardless of the true nature or
origin of the claim. Therefore, state courts will be deciding disputes
which are covered by provisions in the parties' contract even though the
agreement contains mandatory provisions for dispute resolution.
For example, most collective bargaining agreements contain a provision stating that an employer cannot fire an employee without "just
cause."''
If an arbitrator finds a dismissal was without just cause, the
155. For a discussion of the policy of uniform interpretation, see supra

notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
156. The Court in Lingle stated that interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements "remains firmly in the arbitral realm." Lingle, 108 S.Ct. at 1884.
However, literal interpretation of the agreement alone does not promote the
policies of § 301. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985)
("If the policies that animate § 301 are to be given their proper range . . . the
pre-emptive effect of § 301 must extend beyond suits alleging contract
violations.").
157. See Kinyon & Rohlik, Deflouring Lucas Through Labored Characterizations:
Tort Actions of Unionized Employees, 30 Sr. Louis U.L.J. 1, 5 (1986) (state tort actions are conceptually disputes arising from employment relationships covered
by collective bargaining agreements and arbitration clauses).

158. For a background discussion of § 301 preemption in a contract claim
context, see supra notes 21-68 and accompanying text.
159. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211.
160. Id.
161. H. PERRIVr, Supra note 15, at 128.
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employee generally is entitled to reinstatement with back pay. 162 Following Lingle, state courts will now follow the same decision-making process when resolving state wrongful discharge claims as when
interpreting the just cause provisions of collective bargaining agreements. Although it may not be necessary to establish the lack of just
cause under the collective bargaining agreement in order to establish
the elements of the state tort claim, the same aspect of the employment
relationship will be defined by state courts-whether the employee was
"wrongfully" discharged or discharged "without cause."' 163 Thus, employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement containing a just
cause provision may relabel their contract claims as state tort claims and
have an opportunity for additional damages not provided in the collective bargaining agreement.16 4 This consequence conflicts with the AllisChalmers Court's statement that section 301 preempts interpretation of
terms of the agreement and the "legal consequences . . . intended to
flow from breaches of that agreement." ' 165 If states allow additional
remedies for violation of rights protected under the collective bargaining agreement, they will have redefined the legal consequences for
162. Id. at 146.
163. "Most wrongful discharge actions involve some variant of a claim that
the discharge was not for 'just cause.' " Wheeler & Browne, Federal Preemption of
State l1'rongfid Dischamge Actions, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1, 2 (1986). The arbitration

process and wrongful discharge actions contain the same basic decision-making
process. See Kinyon & Rohlik, supra note 157, at 8. The only major differences
between the decision-making processes in state wrongful discharge actions and
in arbitration hearings are the informality of the arbitration hearings and lack of
rules of evidence. Id. Additionally, although there could be a different test in
law and in arbitration, this distinction is artificial because there is no uniformity
in the test applied in law. Id. at 9. Wrongful discharge claims are "conceptually
disputes arising from employment relationships covered by the collective bargaining agreement and . . . the arbitration clause in the agreement." Id. at 5.
164. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985). In Allis-CIalmers the Court stated:
Since nearly any alleged willful breach of contract can be restated
as a tort claim for breach of a good-faith obligation under a contract,
the arbitrator's role in every case could be bypassed easily if § 301 is
not understood to pre-empt such claims. Claims involving vacation or
overtime pay, work assignment, nnfair dischaige-in short, the whole
range of disputes traditionally resolved through arbitration-could be
brought in the first instance in state court by a complaint in tort rather
than in contract.
Id. at 219-20 (emphasis added).
165. Id. at 211. The Court fully stated:
The interests in interpretive uniformity and predictability that require
that labor-contract disputes be resolved by reference to federal law also
require that the meaning given a contract phrase or term be subject to

uniform federal interpretation. Thus, questions relating to what the
parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were
intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by
reference to uniform federal law ....
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breaches of provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. 166
B.

Promote and Protect the Arbitration Process

In order to maintain orderly and peaceful settlements, section 301
seeks to promote and protect collectively-bargained grievance arbitration procedures. 16 7 The Supreme Court has attempted to foster this
policy in several ways, including requiring exhaustion of bargained-for
grievance procedures before making a claim under section 301,168 and
promoting finality of the arbitrator's decision. 169 Lingle frustrates the
federal labor policy preference for arbitration by not requiring exhaustion of the agreed-upon grievance-arbitration procedures before bringing a state tort action.' 70 This result is entirely inconsistent with the
Court's statement in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox. 17 '

In Maddox, the

Court stated that a rule permitting an individual to sidestep available
grievance procedures would cause arbitration to lose most of its effectiveness, as well as eviscerate the policy that it is the arbitrator, and not
the court, who has the responsibility to interpret the labor contract in
the first instance. 172 The Maddox Court explained that to excuse an employee from exhausting the procedures available under a collective bargaining agreement would have the effect of deterring the employer from
7
entering into arbitration clauses when negotiating future agreements. 3
To the extent that Lingle gives individual employees independent access
74
to courts, the incentive to arbitrate and negotiate diminishes. 1
166. See Comment, NLRA Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge Claims, 34
L.J. 635, 639 n.21 (1983) ("If a state permits imposition of punitive
damages, and the bargaining agreement provides only for equitable remedies,
then a decision that the state law is not preempted will cause a deviation from
the terms of the bargaining agreement.").
167. For a further discussion of the promotion and protection of collectively-bargained arbitration procedures, see supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
168. For a further discussion of exhaustion of grievance procedures, see
supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
169. For a further discussion of the finality of arbitration, see supra notes
36-68 and accompanying text.
170. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1884.
171. 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965). For a discussion of Maddox, see supra
notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
HASTINGS

172. Maddox, 379 U.S. at 652-53.
173. Id.
174. Id. Where an employee has the state law protections and a forum for
adjudication, the protections offered by unions become less important. Further,
the employer has less incentive to negotiate arbitration procedures because
these procedures will nonetheless be non-exclusive. Cf. Gould, Hay & Rosenfeld, W~hen State and Federal Laws Collide: Preemption-Nightmareor Opportunity?, 9
INDUS. REL. L.J. 1, 10 (1987) (studies done in wake of Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), on use of arbitration indicate that unions and
employers have become more interested in resolving disputes through agreed
upon procedures now that another forum exists).
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The Maddox Court further stated that the employer and the union
should not be deprived of the ability to establish a uniform and exclusive
method for the orderly settlement of employee grievances.' 75 Lingle
frustrates this policy by making the grievance procedures established in
the collective bargaining agreement non-exclusive, thus depriving these
procedures of much of their utility and effectiveness. In addition, grievance procedures are generally more expeditious and less costly than civil
litigation.' 76 These benefits will mean little if unionized employees are
allowed to resort to civil litigation in the first instance to settle their
disputes. 177

Lingle further frustrates the policy favoring arbitration as the preferred method of dispute resolution by not giving effect to arbitration
awards.17 8 This directly conflicts with the Supreme Court's decisions in
the Steelworker's Trilogy in which the Court stated that courts should not
review arbitration awards so long as the award draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement. 7'1 The congressional policy of favoring arbitration as the preferred method of dispute resolution will only
be furthered if parties to a collective bargaining agreement can rely on
the finality of the award.'
175. Maddox, 379 U.S. at 652-53.
176. See R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 543.
177. Arguably, in order to allow unionized employees the benefit of state
law protections yet not cause arbitration to lose effectiveness, states could require employees to exhaust the remedies under the collective bargaining agreement and, if successful, bring an action in state court in order to have the benefit
of punitive and consequential damages available under tort actions. See Wheeler
& Browne, supra note 163, at 33. In this way, states would be able to not only
provide all employees the protections it creates, but also promote and protect
the arbitration process.
However, arguably, not allowing employees covered by collective bargaining agreements the opportunity to bring state law claims and, potentially, collect
punitive damages is a trade-off for the benefits and protections provided by the
agreement. For a discussion of union benefits, see Herman, supra note 39, at
601 n.18 (benefit unions offer is an end to discriminatory and arbitrary treatment, improved working conditions, protection against unjust termination and
participation in workplace decision-making); Perritt, llrontgfil Dismissal Legislation, 35 UCLA L. REV. 65, 69 (1987) (one benefit of unionization is protection
from arbitrary dismissal; accordingly, trade union groups are ambivalent toward
proposed wrongful discharge statutes).
178. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1884. The Ligle Court stated that judges can determine questions of state law if the questions do not require construing the
collective bargaining agreement. Id. Further, the Court stated that an arbitrator's decision on a particular question may or may not be consistent with the
proper interpretation of state law. Id. at 1885. Therefore, the arbitrator's award
is not a bar to a subsequent state law action.
179. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 597 (1960).
180. Finality of the award depends on other f1rums giving res judicata effect to arbitration awards. For the doctrine of resjudicata to apply in arbitration
proceedings, there must be (1) a final decision on the merits in a prior proceed-
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C. Extension of Exceptions to Section 301 Policy
If Lingle is read as extending the Gardner-Denverline of exceptions to
the federal policy of promoting and protecting the arbitration process,
as opposed to clarifying section 301 preemption of state actions, then
the decision is more consistent with the policies underlying section
301.1'" Factually, Lingle is more analogous to Gardner-Denver than AllisChalmers. In Lingle, the state claim was based on a statute,' 8 2 whereas in
Allis-Chalmers the state claim was a common law tort action.'18 3 The
workers' compensation statute in Lingle can be seen as a statute which
gives minimum substantive protection of workers, like the federal antidiscrimination statute in Gardner-Denver.184
Section 301 does not explicitly prohibit state regulation of labor relations or the establishment of minimum labor standards.' 8 5 In fact, the
Lingle Court stated that its recent holding in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v.
Coyne '86 extended the Gardner-Denver reasoning to state statutes establishing minimum labor standards as rights independent of the collective
bargaining agreement. '8 7 Thus, it can be argued that Lingle does not set
forth a definitive test for deciding when section 301 preempts a state law
claim; rather, Allis-Chalmers still controls this question. Instead, Lingle
can be viewed as an exception to the usual Allis-Chalmers analysis due to
ing, (2) identity of the claims, and (3) identity of the parties to the grievance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84 (1982).
In a grievance hearing to decide whether a dismissal was without "just
cause," the arbitrator would make a final decision on the merits while identifying
the claims and parties. An employee should be required to exhaust the grievance procedures first and an arbitrator's award should be given res judicata
effect.
181. For a discussion of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974), and its progeny, see supra notes 46-68 and accompanying text.
182. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1879. The state Workers' Compensation Act in
Lingle gave rise to a judicially-created tort of retaliatory discharge where an employer interfered with the employee's right to compensation under the statute.
See Kelsay v. Motorola, 74 11. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1987) (state recognized
cause of action for discharge in retaliation for filing worker's compensation
claim). This tort was extended to employees covered by collective bargaining
agreements in Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 II. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280
(1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985). For a further discussion of Alidgett, see
supra note 138. See also Note, Retaliatory Discharge-Illinois'Extensionof Retaliatory
Discharge Tort Actions to Employment Relationships Governed by Collective Bargaining
Agreements: ,Vew Obstacles Imposed by Federal Labor Law Preemption, 4 S. ILL. U.L.J.
707 (1985).
183. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 206 (1985). The action
in Allis-Chalners was based on the Wisconsin tort of bad-faith handling of an insurance claim. Id.
184. See Kinyon & Rohlik, supra note 157, at 45 (state actions for retaliatory
discharge for filing workers' compensation claims parallels kind of individual
statutory right found in Gardner-Denver).

185. For the text of § 301, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
186. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
187. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1885 (citing Fort Hlalifax, 482 U.S. at 7).
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the statutory source of right under which the plaintiff brought her
claim.""' If Lingle is viewed in this way, as an exception following the
Gardner-Denver line of exceptions, then the Lingle Court's statement that
preclusive effect need not be given to arbitration awards is consistent
with Supreme Court precedent.
1. Exhaustion of Grievance-ArbitrationNot Required
The Lingle Court's suggestion that preclusive effect not be given to
adverse arbitration awards is consistent with the policies behind the
Gardner-Denver exception.' 9 The theory common to the Gardner-Denver
line of cases was "that notwithstanding the strong policies encouraging
arbitration, 'different considerations apply where the employee's claim
is based on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum
substantive guarantees to individual workers.' -",9 These different considerations include: (1) that federal and state minimum substantive
guarantees are intended to supplement existing institutions relating to
employment; I J' I (2) arbitral processes are not appropriate forums for
these rights;" 9 2- and (3) preemption should be lightly inferred in these
cases because establishment of minimum substantive guarantees falls
3
within the states' traditional police power.'-9
However, although the state action in Lingle could be viewed as
stemming from a statute providing minimum substantive guarantees,
none of the considerations underlying the exception to arbitration as the
preferred method of dispute resolution are present. First, the right in
Lingle-to be free from discharge in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim-is not supplementary to the existing institutions (here
the collective bargaining agreement) relating to employment. Rather,
188. Some commentators have suggested that the source of the cause of
action should play a determinative role in § 301 preemption. See Wheeler &
Browne, supra note 163, at 36 (in order to find no preemption, a directly controlling statute or constitutional provision should be identified to justify finding significant state interest to override federal interest in promoting arbitration). But
see Herman, supra note 39, at 636-37 (whether action based on statute or on
decisional law is irrelevant in preemption analysis).

189. See Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1884 (citing McDonald v. West Branch, 466
U.S. 284 (1984) (Civil Rights Act of 1871); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight

Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (Title VII)).
190. Id.(quoting Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S.
557 (1987) (quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728
(1981))). Some commentators have argued that Gardner-Denverand its progeny
are distinguishable from and, therefore, inapplicable to instances where state
law is at issue because the Court was interpreting and harmonizing two federal
statutes. See, e.g., Kinyon & Rohlik, supra note 157, at 40-44. But see Herman,
supra note 39, at 615-16 ("independent, nonwaivable rights analysis is apposite
to claims irrespective of whether based on federal or state law").
191. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 52.
192. Id. at 58.
193. Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 7.
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this guarantee of freedom from retaliatory discharge is subsumed in the
just cause provision of the collective bargaining agreement. 194 An employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement already enjoys protection from retaliatory discharge because discharge for filing a workers'
compensation claim is not "just cause." Second, the use of an arbitral
forum to resolve the dispute is particularly appropriate in this type of
action. Both parties in cases such as Lingle will have agreed to be bound
by a collective bargaining agreement which requires the resolution of
discharge claims through established grievance-arbitration procedures. '1 15 Further, the arbitrator is not required to interpret federal or
state law but, rather, is only required to make a determination as to
whether the employee was fired in retaliation for filing the workers'
compensation claim. This is a fact-sensitive inquiry and, as such, does
not involve determination of matters outside the realm of an arbitrator's
expertise.
Finally, although establishing minimum labor standards is within
the state's traditional police power, the federal labor policies underlying
section 301 preemption should outweigh the state's interest in these
cases because (1) employees covered by collective bargaining agreements with "just cause" provisions do not need state protection against
wrongful discharge; (2) allowing unionized employees to bring state actions would undermine the federal labor policies of section 301; '97 and
(3) the retaliatory discharge tort in Lingle is not a minimum labor standard as envisioned in Fort Halifax or Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts. 11) In Metropolitan Life, the state statute required minimum
194. See Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 I11.
App. 3d 402, 405-06, 407
N.E.2d 95, 98 (1980) ("[Tlhe concept of retaliatory discharge is subsumed
within the just cause provision and is within the power of the arbitrator to consider when determining if a discharge is for just cause.").
195. See H. PERRITr, supra note 15, at 127-28. Professor Perritt suggests
that a grievance which may be resolved by arbitration may involve disputes over
the application of contract language or it may involve contractual limitations on
disciplinary action against an employee. Id. at 127. Grievance and arbitration
procedures guarantee that contractual provisions will be enforced without resort
to the use of ordinary courts. Id. at 128. Employers favor arbitration provisions
because they permit peaceful resolution of disputes without strikes. Id.
196. See Herman, supra note 39, at 651 (wrongful discharge disputes tend to
be fact bound and, thus, Gardner-Denverand its progeny are distinguishable on
grounds of institutional competence because Title VII and Fair Labor Standards
Act often present thorny questions of statutory interpretation).
197. See Wheeler & Browne, supro note 163, at 23. Some commentators
argue that wrongful discharge actions pose a significant threat of disruption to
collectively-bargained grievance and arbitration procedures and that insufficient
weight has been given to the principles underlying § 301 preemption. Under
this view, all wrongful discharge actions would be preempted except where the
state has expressly made a right independent of the collective agreement nonnegotiable. Id. at 23, 44.
198. 471 U.S. 724 (1987). In Metropolitan Life, the Court stated:
'States possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate
the employment relationship to protect workers within the State. Child

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989

35

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 5 [1989], Art. 10

1070

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34: p. 1035

mental health care benefits be provided to employees, and in Fort Halifax
the statute dealt with one-time severance pay for employees in the event
of a plant closing. '" In both cases, the Court stated that the NLRA is
concerned with the process for determining terms and conditions of employment and not with the substantive terms of the collective bargaining
agreement.2 ° However, the Court stated that if state statutes frustrate
the legislative goals of the NLRA, they should be preempted. 2° 1 The
tort action in Lingle is not a state minimum labor standard because it
does not define a substantive term of the agreement like those in Metropolitan Life or Fort Halifax.' Rather, the availability of a tort action simply
provides an additional forum and remedy for a discharge without "just
cause." The policies of section 301 and the NLRA are frustrated when
agreed-upon provisions for dispute resolution are not the exclusive remedy for conduct covered by the agreement.
2.

Rejection of Waiver of Employee's Right

The Court addressed the question of waiver in Gardner-Denver and
stated that although a union is able to waive certain statutory rights
which are related to collective activity, a party to a collective bargaining
agreement can not waive an individual's substantive right.2 2 Lingle involved a statute which expressly prohibited the waiver of rights under
the workers' compensation scheme in Illinois. 20 3 Consequently the
Court did not address whether, absent such statutory language, waiver
of such rights is something that may be negotiated at the bargaining
table. 204 If waiver is allowed, then the state cause of action does not, by
definition, fall into the Gardner-Denver line of exceptions which applies
labor laws, minimum and other wage laws, laws affecting occupational
health and safety

.

.

. are only a few examples.' ....

Federal labor law in this sense is interstitial, supplementing state
law where compatible, and supplanting it only when it prevents the accomplishment of the federal Act.
Id. 756 (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976)) (citations omitted).
199. For a discussion of Metropolitan Life and Fort Halifax, see supra notes 5868 and accompanying text.
200. See Fort Haltax, 482 U.S. at 20 (citation omitted); Metropolitan Life, 471
U.S. at 754-55.
201. Id. No incompatibility exists, therefore, between federal rules
designed to restore the equality of bargaining power, and state or federal legislation that imposes minimal substantive requirements on contract terms negotiated between parties to labor agreements, at least so long as the purpose of the
state legislation is not incompatible with these general goals of the NLRA.

Id.
202. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974).
203. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1883 n.9.
204. Another unanswered question after Lingle is as follows: After parties
to a collective bargaining agreement agree to a waiver of state law claims and a
covered employee files an action in state court for wrongful discharge, will the
state bar to the waiver of the state law claim be preempted? The Court in Lingle
stated that before deciding whether a state law bar to waiver could be pre-
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only to individual, nonwaivable rights. 2 0
V.

5

AFTER LI.VGLE

State and federal courts will continue to have difficulty determining
whether state law claims are preempted under section 301. The test set
out in Lingle does not clarify the parameters between state law claims
and preemption under section 301. Therefore, courts are likely to continue deciding the preemption issue on an ad hoc basis.
The continued confusion is illustrated in the cases decided since
Lingle. 2°b Generally, the courts of appeals have viewed Lingle as another
statement of the Allis-Chalmers test for determining which state law
claims are independent of the collective bargaining agreement and,
thus, not preempted. The courts have viewed "independent" state law
claims as ones that do not require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement for their resolution and are not "inextricably intertwined" with the collective bargaining agreement.
However, some courts are also continuing to use the "nonnegotiable" language from Allis-Chalmers in their preemption analyses even
though the Court in Lingle explicitly stated that a determination that
state rights are nonnegotiable is not dispositive under section 301 preemption analysis. 207 This two-step inquiry asks: (1) whether the state
action is "independent" of the collective bargaining agreement; and
(2) whether the state right is one which is nonnegotiable. This inquiry is
consistent with the view that Lingle is a narrow exception-within the
Gardner-Denverline of exceptions-to the Allis-Chalmers test. Viewed this
way, section 301 only has a preemptive effect where the state law claim is
dependent upon the collective bargaining agreement for its resolution
unless the state action provides the employee with a nonnegotiable right.
A.

Lingle As An Extension of the "Independent" Test

Those courts which view Lingle as an extension of the Allis-Chalmers
empted, " 'clear and unmistakable' evidence" of the parties' intent to waive

would be required. Id.
205. Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 52.

206. For a discussion of decisions since Lingle, see infra notes 206-42 and
accompanying text. See also Merchant v. American Steamship Co., 860 F.2d 204

(6th Cir. 1988) (section 301 did not preempt seaman's retaliatory discharge
claim under admiralty law and therefore exhaustion of remedies under the col-

lective bargaining agreement not required); Utility Workers of America v.
Southern California Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1988) (section 301
preempts union's claim that by unilaterally implementing drug-testing program
employer violated rights guaranteed by California constitution); Law v. Calmat,
852 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1988) (section 301 preempts employee's claim seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief after employer imposed mandatory drug-testing
program); Hyles v. Mensing, 849 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1988) (section 301
preempts employee's emotional distress claim).
207. See Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1882 n.7.
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test for determining which state law claims are "independent" of the
collective bargaining agreement and, thus, not preempted have reached
contrary results, depending upon how the court views the elements necessary to the particular claim. The Ninth Circuit held a unionized employee's actions for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and intentional infliction of emotional distress preempted in
Newberry v. Pacific Racing Association.208 The court looked to Lingle and

Allis-Chalmers and stated that both decisions "sent the same message"
and, therefore, proceeded to analyze Newberry's claims under "the
Supreme Court's twin tests." '20 9 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was preempted because the state claim "require[d] . . .interpretation of a col-

lective bargaining agreement" or "is substantially dependent upon
analysis" of the terms of the agreement. 2 10 The Court also held that
section 301 preempted the plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim because the "determination of the validity of her emotional distress claim will require us to decide whether her discharge was
l
justified under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement."''
Conversely the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held
that section 301 did not preempt state actions for discrimination under
the state handicap discrimination statute and retaliatory discharge in
Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp.2 t 2 The court looked to Allis-Chalmers and Lingle

208. 854 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1988). Newberry was employed at Golden
Gate Fields Race Course where the defendant, Pacific Racing Association, conducted racing during the year. Id. at 1144-45. Newberry was discharged after
Pacific conducted an investigation and alleged that Newberry had been misappropriating funds. Id. at 1145. Newberry filed a grievance pursuant to procedures set out in the agreement between Pacific and Newberry's union. Id. The
grievance proceeded to arbitration and the arbitrator found that Pacific did not
have the requisite "just cause" to fire Newberry and awarded her reinstatement,
but not back pay. Id. The district court found Newberry's claims preempted by
§ 301 and granted summary judgment for the defendant. Id. at 1144.
209. Id. at 1146. The court suggested that the two tests do not differ and
stated the tests as: "Does the application of state law 'require[ ] the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement,' Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1885, or 'substantially depend[ ] upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the
parties in a labor contract?,' Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220 .
Newbeny, 854
F.2d at 1147.
210. Newbeny, 854 F.2d at 1147.
211. Id. at 1149.
212. 858 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1988), vacated for reh'g en banc, 866 F.2d 838
(1989). Smolarek was a consolidation of two cases where both employees
brought claims against the employer alleging discrimination under Michigan's
Handicappers' Civil Rights Act (HCRA). Id. at 1166. In addition, both brought
actions alleging retaliation for filing workers' compensation. Id. Both employees, Smolarek and Fleming, were covered by the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1166-67. The employees brought the actions in state court and
Chrysler removed to federal district court where the court found that § 301 preempted all the plaintiffs' claims and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for failure to
exhaust remedies set out by the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
Smolarek's HCRA discrimination claim asserted that he was fired because of
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for an analysis of section 301 preemption. 213 The court found the retaliatory discharge claim to be essentially the same claim as addressed in
Lingle and, with little discussion, found it not preempted by section
301.214 The court next looked to the preemptive effect of section 301
on plaintiff Fleming's discrimination claim.2 15 The court first looked to
the elements the employee would need to demonstrate to establish
prima facie liability under the state statute. 2 16 The court found both
elements to be "purely factual questions" relating to the conduct and
motivation of the employer.2 17 To defend against the action, Chrysler
would have to show "that its actions were motivated by some factor
other than [the employee's] handicap." ' 218 The court acknowledged
that Chrysler would likely assert that it based its actions on provisions in
the collective bargaining agreement. 2 '11 Nevertheless, the court held
that the resolution of the discrimination claim would involve purely factual inquiries, and not involve interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement, because the court would only need to determine Chrysler's
motivation. 22 °1 Therefore, the court concluded that the claim was sufficiently independent of the collective bargaining agreement to "escape"
22 1
section 301 preemption.
Finally, the Eighth Circuit held an employee's state wrongful discharge claim preempted in Hanks v. General Motors Corp.22 2 The court
a seizure he experienced at work. Id.at 1166. On appeal, Smolarek only asserted that the district court had erred in denying his motion to remand on the
issue of discrimination under the HCRA. Id. The court of appeals concluded
that the district court had erred in denying Smolarek's motion. Id. at 1170. The
court of appeals noted that Chrysler may assert its defense that Smolarek's treat-

ment was allowed or required by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and not based on Smolarek's handicap. Id. The court stated that the state
court may need to determine whether § 301 preempts Smolarek's claim based
on Chrysler's defense. Id. (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398
(1987)). However, the court stated that the issue of preemption need not be
decided here because Smolarek's claim was based solely on the state statute and
not federal law or the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
213. Smolarek, 858 F.2d at 1168. The court stated that Lingle attempted to
clarify the language in Allis-Chalmers on what state claims have "independence"
from the collective bargaining agreement and not preempted. Id.

214. Id. at 1168-69.
215. The court stated: "In contrast to Smolarek's appeal from an order
denying remand, Fleming appeals directly from the district court's decision finding § 301 preemptive of Fleming's HCRA and retaliatory discharge claims.
Therefore, we must consider the preemption issue ...." Id. at 1170.
216. Id. The elements necessary to establish liability under the HCRA are:
(1) that the employer took adverse employment actions against the employee
and (2) the actions were motivated by the employee's handicap. Id.
217. Id. (citing Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1882).
218. Id.at 1171.
219. Id.
220. Id.

221. Id.
222. 859 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1988). Hanks was a line worker covered by a
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reasoned that "[i]n order to determine whether... [the employee] was
wrongfully discharged, the court must interpret the terms of the collective bargaining agreement covering termination of employment for failure to return to work." ' 22 3 The court stressed that the elements
necessary to establish the tort would require interpretation of the collec224
tive bargaining agreement.
The courts which have viewed Lingle as a "twin test" with Allis-Chalmers for determining which state actions are independent of the collective bargaining have split depending on the elements of the particular
claim and the need to look to the agreement for resolution of the state
law claim. This approach is inconsistent with the policies underlying
section 301 because disputes arising out of the employment relationship
which are covered by collective bargaining agreements are being decided by the court in the first instance and with inconsistent results depending on the state's formulation of the claim at issue.
B.

Two-Step Inquiry Under Section 301 Preemption

Other courts view Lingle as involving a two-step inquiry under section 301 preemption: (1) whether the state law claim is independent of
the collective bargaining agreement; and (2) whether the state law claim
is nonnegotiable. In Miller v. AT&T Network Systems 22 5 a unionized employee brought two state claims, one alleging discrimination based on
physical handicap in violation of a state statute and another claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 2 2"' The Ninth Circuit held
collective bargaining agreement. Id. Hanks was out of work due to severe depression caused by an incident that occurred at work. Id. at 68. Hanks was
deemed by General Motors (GM) to have voluntarily quit after failing to return
to work when ordered to do so. Id. Hanks filed in state court alleging four
counts: outrageous conduct by GM; wrongful discharge; prima facie tort; and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. GM removed the actions to federal district court where they were dismissed as preempted by § 301. Id.
Although the Eighth Circuit affirmed the preemption of the wrongful discharge
claims, the court withheld judgment on the preemption of the other three causes
of action. Id. at 70. The court stated that on the surface these causes of action
did not require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. However, since it is necessary to also consider if the defenses to be raised require
such an interpretation, and no answer had been filed, the court found it impossible to determine if these actions were preempted. Id.
223. Id. at 69.
224. Id. at 72.
225. 850 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1988). The court in Miller noted that its opinion was completed at the time Lingle was decided, but stated that Lingle confirms
the Ninth Circuit's approach and reaffirms the holding in Allis-Chalmers. Id. at
551 n.6. In Miller, the court continues to use the nonnegotiable language from
Allis-Chalners even though Lingle explicitly stated that this was not a necessary
element when determining "independence" for purposes of § 301 preemption.
226. Id. at 550-51. Miller worked for AT&T for 20 years and was covered
by a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 545. Miller was discharged for refusing to return to work in Mesa, Arizona after he fainted due to the effect of
high temperatures on his heart rate. Id. Miller sued in state court and AT&T
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the emotional distress claim preempted because resolution of the tort
claim requires inquiry into the collective bargaining agreement to-determine the appropriateness of the employer's behavior.2 2 7 However, the
court held the discrimination claim not preempted because it was based
on a "nonnegotiable, independent state right."' 228 The court stated that
interpretation of the concept of "nonnegotiable" is clear: "[A] right is
nonnegotiable if the state law does not permit it to be waived, alienated,
or altered by private agreement."' 229 This would require a statutory
2"
right with an express bar on waiver of the right.
However, the court found the concept of "independence" from
rights established by the contract more difficult to define. 2 3' The court
stated that independent rights are those state law rights that can be enforced without relying on the terms of the labor contract. 23 2 However,
mere similarity between state law protections and provisions in the collective bargaining agreement does not mandate preemption.2 3 3 Rather,
preemption requires that the dispute could be resolved under the collective bargaining agreement and that state law cannot be applied without
23 4
reference to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
Further, the Ninth Circuit in Miller set out a hybrid test for section
301 preemption using Allis-Chalmers as a basis. 23 5 The court stated that
when deciding whether section 301 preempts state law claims a court
must consider: (1) whether the collective bargaining agreement contains explicit or implied provisions that govern the actions giving rise to
a state claim; (2) whether there is a sufficiently clear state standard which
would allow resolution without interpreting the collective bargaining
agreement; and (3) whether the state claim can be altered or waived by
the collective bargaining agreement. 2 3" The court stated that a state law
removed to federal district court where it obtained summary judgment on both
claims based on § 301 preemption. Id.
227. Id. at 551. The court stated that intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims may not be preempted where particular behavior by the employer
has been explicitly prohibited by mandatory statute orjudicial decree. Id. at 550
n.5.
228. Id. at 546, 549-50.
229. Id. at 546.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. The court rejected the defendant's contention that the state statute
was preempted because the collective bargaining agreement offered parallel
protection. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 548.
236. Id. Further, the Ninth Circuit stated that preemption in Allis-Chalmers
was not based on the overlap of state tort law and the collective bargaining
agreement but rather was based on the fact that there was no articulated, independent standard by which to judge the action. Id. at 546. The Ninth Circuit

asserted that this lack of an articulated, independent standard by which to judge
the state action permits private parties to contractually modify the state stan-
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claim will be preempted under this test only if the answer to the first
question is "yes" and the answer to either the second or third is
"no."237

The First Circuit also held an employee's state law claims preempted in Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp.2 38 Consistent with Lingle, the
First Circuit asserted that the section 301 preemption analysis begins
with the question of whether the state claim can be resolved without
interpreting the collective bargaining agreement.2 3 9 The court gave
several reasons for the conclusion that the employee's privacy claims
based on federal and state law cannot be resolved without interpreting
the collective bargaining agreement: (1) there is no absolute right to be
free from drug testing under either the state or federal constitution;
(2) under the state or federal constitution or Massachusetts state privacy
law, the claim's resolution rests on the balancing of the employer's legitimate concerns and the employee's privacy rights; and (3) a right subject
to a balancing of interests of the employee and employer is defined by
2 4
the parties and, therefore, preempted. '
dard. Id. In holding Miller's state claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress preempted, the court started by asking the three questions it had outlined earlier and found that this claim was preempted because it required interpreting the terms of a collective bargaining agreement and the claim was
negotiable. Id. at 550-51.
237. Id. at 548.
238. 863 F.2d I1 (1st Cir. 1988). Jackson, a truckdriver, was covered by a
collective bargaining agreement which contained a "management rights" clause
and a provision outlining mandatory grievance and arbitration procedures. Id.
at 112-13. Jackson was discharged after his employer found, through a drug
testing program, traces of drugs in his urine. Id. at 113. Jackson did not pursue
the grievance procedures and brought an action in state court alleging three
counts: that the search and seizure of his urine violated the state civil rights act
by interfering with his right to privacy and to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures under state and federal law; that the seizure and testing of
his urine constituted an invasion of privacy under state law; and that his discharge constituted a wrongful dismissal in violation of public policy. Id.
239. Id. at 114. The court discussed at length the purpose and history behind § 301 preemption. Id. Specifically, the court focused on the importance of
uniform interpretation and grievance-arbitration procedures. Id. ("[W]here the
[labor] contract provides grievance and arbitration procedures, those procedures must first be exhausted and courts must order resort to the private settlement mechanism without dealing with the merits of the dispute.") (quoting
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29 (1987)).
240. Id. at 115-17. The court did not analyze the search and seizure claims
because the "reasonableness" inquiry is the same under the state constitution,
the federal constitution and the state privacy claims. Id. at 119 n.4.
In its discussion on whether the state privacy claim is independent of the
collective bargaining agreement, the court cited Laws v. Calmat, 852 F.2d 430
(9th Cir. 1988), for the proposition that there must exist an "established or recognized state claim" to establish that the state claim is independent of the collective bargaining agreement. Jackson, 863 F.2d at 115. The court also pointed to
its earlier decision in Bratt v. IBM, 785 F.2d 352 (1st Cir. 1986), where it recognized that privacy rights are affected by a firm's own regulations. Jackson, 863
F.2d at 117.
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Moreover, the court reasoned that the employee's rights here were
negotiable and could be waived or altered by the agreement. 2 4 1 However, similar to the Ninth Circuit's test in Miller, the court pointed out
that if the state created a privacy action, either by enacting a "sufficiently
explicit statute" or by "sufficiently pointed judicial explication," analysis
of preemption would be different because interpretation of collective
2 42
bargaining agreement may not be necessary.
The courts which view the analysis of preemption under section 301
as a two-step inquiry seem to read Lingle as involving an independent
and nonnegotiable state right, thus falling within the Gardner-Denver exception to the federal labor policies underlying section 301 preemption.
Under this view, section 301 would preempt state tort actions if resolution of the claim is dependent on the collective bargaining agreement
and there is no explicit state statute or controlling judicial decision
which makes the right nonnegotiable.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Lingle failed to set out a new test which will
relieve the tension between federal preemption under section 301 and
state law claims. In fact, the courts of appeals have again split on their
interpretations of section 301 preemption. 2 43 It is likely that the
Supreme Court will again address the parameters of preemption under
section 301.
In order to align the Lingle decision with Supreme Court precedent,
Lingle could be viewed as an example of an independent, nonnegotiable
state right which is not preempted by section 301 under Allis-Chalmers.
Viewed in this way, as a narrow exception analogous to the Gardner-Denver line of exceptions to the federal labor policies underlying section
301, Lingle is more consistent with Supreme Court pronouncements
over the past thirty years. However, Lingle does not clearly fit in this line
of exceptions because the state statute relied on did not involve a minimum substantive right.
A better view of the Lingle decision is that the analysis, unarticulated
by the Court, is laid out in Miller v. AT&T Network Systems. 244 The Miller
241. Jackson, 863 F.2d at 117-18. The court looked to Allis-Chalniersand de-

termined that if the claim is "firmly rooted in the expectations of the parties [it]
must be evaluated by federal contract law ....
[Rights are not independent if
they] can be waived or altered by agreement.
Id. at 118 (quoting AllisChalmers, 471 U.S. at 213).
242. Id. at 117 n.3. The court stated that the employer's drug-testing plan
at issue compromised "no independent, bedrock, state-law right, presently established, which would allow analysis of the Agreement to be foregone." Id.
243. For a discussion of the split among the circuits before Lingle, see supra
notes 84-120 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the split in the circuits
after Lingle, see supra notes 206-42 and accompanying text.
244. For a discussion of this test, see supra notes 225-37 and accompanying

text.
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analysis contains an excellent articulation of the holding in Allis-Chalmers
and a workable analysis for section 301 preemption. Further, the Miller
analysis accommodates both the state interest in providing minimum labor standards and federal labor policies. When faced with the issue of
section 301 preemption and state law claims, courts should view the
analysis in Miller as a good framework for deciding the parameters of
preemption under section 301.
Michelle Smith Nofer
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